(A) A judge shall not make any statement that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome or impair the fairness of a matter pending or impending in any court.

(B) The judge shall require similar abstention on the part of staff, court officers, and others subject to the judge's direction and control.

(C) A judge shall not, with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the court, make pledges, promises, or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial* performance of the adjudicative duties of judicial office.

A lesson is learned? Doubtful....

Asking the question when all it does is make you appear responsible without either reversing the damage done or preventing the same from happening again is pandering.

Now if he were to acknowledge the damage to the constitution done at his behest that would be something to see, but it aint gonna happen.

The idea for a review came to Specter when he said he ran into Justice Stephen G. Breyer at the Aspen Ideas Festival in Colorado.....

Specter, who said he will do the review when he "gets a spare moment," would not go as far as Feinstein on whether he feels misled.

"Don't put words in my mouth," Specter said.

  Certainly I would sympathize with litigants who believed that the judge or justice who had made such an unequivocal statement was something less than impartial.

  You are confusing my  OBJECTION with my observation that many well qualified and fair minded people might feel constrained from making the comment "_ should/should not be overruled" because of their understanding and interpretation of the rules. Categorically rejecting anyone who believes he or she should not make such statements because they will be seen as promises, pledges or commitments is wrong in my view.

  The  purpose of the rules against judges making statements which call their impartiality into question  does make sense-- although it is perfectly reasonable to reject the rationale-- because the prohibitions are based on the underlying principle that not only should judges be impartial but that they should avoid behavior which creates the appearance of partiality.

Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii)

  ...a  judge or a candidate for election or appointment to judicial office shall not--
with respect to cases, controversies, or issues that are likely to come before the
court, make pledges, promises or commitments that are inconsistent with the impartial performance of the adjudicative duties of the office....

Here are some other views:

Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: "A judge sworn to decide impartially can offer no forecasts, no hints, for that would show not only disregard for the specifics of the particular case, it would display disdain for the entire judicial process. Similarly, because you are considering my capacity for independent judging, my personal views on how I would vote on a publicly debated issue, were I in your shoes, were I a legislator, are not what you will be closely examining."

"Because I am and hope to continue to be a judge, it would be wrong for me to say or to
preview in this legislative chamber how I would cast my vote on questions the Supreme
Court may be called upon to decide. Were I to rehearse here what I would say and how I
would reason on such questions, I would act injudiciously."
"[H]ow a prospective nominee for the bench would resolve particular contentious issues
would certainly be `of interest' to the President and the Senate in the exercise of their
respective nomination and confirmation powers . . . . But in accord with a longstanding
norm, every member of this Court declined to furnish such information to the Senate, and
presumably to the President as well." -- Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 807 n.1 (2002) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)

Justice Sandra Day O'Connor:"I feel that is improper for me to endorse or criticize a decision which may well come back
before the Court in one form or another and indeed appears to be coming back with some
regularity in a variety of contexts. I do not think we have seen the end of that issue or that
holding and that is the concern I have about expressing an endorsement or criticism of that
holding."

Justice Stephen Breyer: "I do not want to predict or to commit myself on an open issue that I feel is going to come up in the Court. ... There are two real reasons. The first real reason is how often it is when we express ourselves casually or express ourselves without thorough briefing and thorough thought about a matter that I or some other judge might make a mistake. ... The other
reason, which is equally important, is ... it is so important that the clients and the lawyers
understand the judges are really open-minded."

"The questions that you are putting to me are matters of how that basic right applies, where
it applies, under what circumstances. And I do not think I should go into those for the
reason that those are likely to be the subject of litigation in front of the Court."

Justice John Paul Stevens: "A candidate for judicial offices who goes beyond the expression of `general observations about the law ... in order to obtain favorable consideration' of his candidacy demonstrates either a lack of impartiality or a lack of understanding of the importance of maintaining public confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary." Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 800 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting)

Justice David Souter: "[C]an you imagine the pressure that would be on a judge who had stated an opinion, or seemed to have given a commitment in these circumstances to the Senate of the United States, and for all practical purposes, to the American people?"

Justice Anthony Kennedy: "[The] reason for our not answering detailed questions with respect to our views on specific cases, or specific constitutional issues [is that] the public expects that the judge will keep an open mind, and that he is confirmed by the Senate because of his temperament and hischaracter, and not because he has taken particular positions on the issues."

The problem is purely political. If Leahy voted for Roberts, something basic is wrong with the Democrats. Even the nuclear options would have now been a real help against the Bush Republicans and made stopping the Iraq chaos, it's not a war since we don't have an enemy there, a reality.

  The idea that voting against any nominee who declines to  answer questions  which many  people believe judicial nominees should not answer due to ethical rules designed to protect the impartiality and appearance of impartiality  of judges and the independence of the judiciary is a very bad one.

  As you can see such a stance would eliminate peope you like just as often as people you dislike-- all for a bad reason. The "phoniness" is the pose that the willingness to answer the questions has anything to do with the decision of the Senators. We all know that everyone already has their mind made up about what the nominee's views are the big issues. the issue isn;t the willingness to state a position--it's the position.

   If Democratic senators want to vote against Republican nominees because they think those nominees will vote in ways they oppose, fine-- and vice versa. Personally, I prefer the idea of a philosophically balanced court with members reprsenting a broad spectrum of philosophies and views all represented by highly qualified and fair jurists, but that's just me (Even I want  the  jurists who agree more frequently with me to be better represented than those who less frequently agree with me. I just don't want partisan litmus tests.)

  The issue should NOT be whether the nominee shares or does not share our views as to the extent of the constraint on such comments. Reasonable people, including many highly qualified candidates-- and highly qualified candidates who share views on the actual issues themselves-- would be rejected simply for doing what they believe they are supposed to do.