Defense attorneys emphasized in their closing argument that it's not enough to believe a defendant is "likely" guilty or even "highly likely" guilty, using a thermometer chart to make the point.

Something like this. The chart is not evidence and doesn't go to the jury. O'Mara used one in Zimmerman, they are pretty common.

The Fourth Circuit (which includes the EDVA) does not believe judges need to define reasonable doubt because its meaning is self-evident and trying to define it will likely confuse the jury. It is up to the individual judge whether to define it, even when a jury requests it. I think that's nuts.

In Manafort's case, the judge's actual instructions are not on the docket, but the Govt. submitted this one and Manafort's defense stated it had no objection:

Presumption of Innocence, Burden of Proof, Reasonable Doubt

I instruct you that you must presume the defendant to be innocent of the crimes charged. Thus the defendant, although accused of crimes in the superseding indictment, begins the trial with a "clean slate"--with no evidence against him. The superseding indictment, as you already know, is not evidence of any kind. The law permits nothing but legal evidence presented before the jury in court to be considered in support of any charge against a defendant. The presumption of innocence alone, therefore, is sufficient to acquit the defendant.

The burden is always upon the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon the defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence by cross-examining the witnesses for the government.

The jury will remember that a defendant is never to be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture.
Unless the government proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant has committed each and every element of the offenses charged in the superseding indictment, you must find the defendant not guilty of the offenses.
It is not required, however, that the government prove guilt beyond all possible doubt. The test is one of reasonable doubt.

[Sources: 1A O'Malley, Grenig, and Lee, Federal Jury Practice and Instructions, § 12:10 (6th ed. updated through February 2018) (definition of "reasonable doubt" and "two-inference instruction" omitted to conform with Fourth Circuit law); see United States v. Blankenship, 846 F.3d 663, 679 (4th Cir. 2017) (directing district courts not to use the two-inference instruction); United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998) ("a district court need not, and in fact should not, define the term `reasonable doubt' even upon request") United States v. Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 298 (4th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Oriakhi, 57 F.3d 1290 (4th Cir. 1995).

The first question was about the requirements to file FBAR reports. At the request of prosecutor Greg Andres, Judge Ellis re-read the jury instructions about the law regarding FBAR reports.

The second question asked for a definition of "shelf" companies, and their filing requirements. Ellis told the jury they will have to rely on their collective recollection from the testimony and evidence in the trial.

The third question asked to redefine or give explanation of the term reasonable doubt. Ellis responded that reasonable doubt means "doubt based on reason," and that the government is not required to prove guilt beyond "all possible doubt."

The final question asked by the jury was whether the exhibit list in the case could be amended to reflect the indictment counts. Ellis said no, that jurors must rely on their memory of which exhibits were used during certain parts of testimony.