Stare Decisis
Discussing Judge Vinson's ruling on the health bill, Orin Kerr writes:
If you are an originalist, [. . . i]f you’re a libertarian [Judge Vinson's ruling] is [. . .] very appealing [. . .]. But there’s a technical problem here that I want to draw out: Judge Vinson is only a District Court judge. Under the principle of vertical stare decisis, he is bound by Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g, Winslow v. F.E.R.C., 587 F.3d 1133. 1135 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J.) (“Vertical stare decisis — both in letter and in spirit — is a critical aspect of our hierarchical Judiciary headed by ‘one supreme Court.’”) (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 1). [. . . T]he judge has to apply the doctrine established by the Supreme Court and has to ignore the original meaning.
[. . . Y]ou have to confront the doctrinal test that the U.S. Supreme Court offered in a majority opinion just a few months ago in United States v. Comstock:
[I]n determining whether the Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular federal statute, we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.[W]hen the Supreme Court says that this is what “we look to see” when determining if a power falls within the Constitution, then that is a doctrinal test to which a trial judge is bound under the principle of stare decisis.
More . . .
< The Politics of "Judicial Activism" | Introducing The WSJ To James Madison > |