The principal purpose of this Court's exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction is to clarify the law. See this Court's Rule 10. As The Chief Justice's dissent makes painfully clear, the principal consequence of today's decision is to create vast uncertainty with respect to a point of law that can be raised in all litigated cases in (at least) those 39 States that elect their judges. This course was urged upon us on grounds that it would preserve the public's confidence in the judicial system. Brief for Petitioners 16.

The decision will have the opposite effect. What above all else is eroding public confidence in the Nation's judicial system is the perception that litigation is just a game, that the party with the most resourceful lawyer can play it to win, that our seemingly interminable legal proceedings are wonderfully self-perpetuating but incapable of delivering real-world justice. The Court's opinion will reinforce that perception, adding to the vast arsenal of lawyerly gambits what will come to be known as the Caperton claim. The facts relevant to adjudicating it will have to be litigated--and likewise the law governing it, which will be indeterminate for years to come, if not forever. Many billable hours will be spent in poring through volumes of campaign finance reports, and many more in contesting nonrecusal decisions through every available means.

A Talmudic maxim instructs with respect to the Scripture: "Turn it over, and turn it over, for all is therein." The Babylonian Talmud, Tractate Aboth, Ch. V, Mishnah 22 (I. Epstein ed. 1935). Divinely inspired text may contain the answers to all earthly questions, but the Due Process Clause most assuredly does not. The Court today continues its quixotic quest to right all wrongs and repair all imperfections through the Constitution. Alas, the quest cannot succeed--which is why some wrongs and imperfections have been called nonjusticiable.

In the best of all possible worlds, should judges sometimes recuse even where the clear commands of our prior due process law do not require it? Undoubtedly. The relevant question, however, is whether we do more good than harm by seeking to correct this imperfection through expansion of our constitutional mandate in a manner ungoverned by any discernable rule. The answer is obvious."

Geithner and Summers defend the banksters,

Pelosi and Reid impersonate Sgt. Schultz....

I see nothing!!

  Some of the circumstances either directly relevant or surrounding the whole circus include:

  1. Benjamin was a complete nobody prior to his campaign. Even most lawyers in the state had apparently never heard of him and his career as a junior partner at a corporate firm evidently included no trials and a mere one appearance on brief in an appeal. Virtually his entire practice was apparently limited to processing mundane administrative law matters.

  2. His opponent, Warren McGraw, is apparently  widely considered a nut-- even by those who supported him--- and the reference to the speech used against him pertains  to a Labor Day speech at a UMWA rally that is by any standard supportiveof that perception link.

  3. Massey is perhaps the worst coal company in the nation in terms of environmental record, safety, labor relations, wtc., and this exercise of tortious business practices against a competitor is well down on its list of sins.

  4. Blankenship is widely considered a thug who rose to the top of Massey be being even meaner and nastier than his peers. He furthered that image by threatening an ABC reporter with physical harm on camera (can't find a video link).

  5. The "For the Sake of the Kid's  campaign was considered one of the dirtiest and most dishonest ones in the history of West Virginia which is no small feat. Essentially, despite the fact the 527 was a Blankenship effort to remove a justice considered pro-labor/anti-business, it focused on a single case taken out of context which involved a  Supreme Court decision allowing release of a young disabled man accused of a sexual assault of a minor. The campaign portrayed McGraw as not caring about children and part of a conspiracy to loose sexual predators on defenseless children.

 6. Justice Davis is married to one of the most successful and richest plaintiff's lawyers in the state and was originally elected with massive support from the plaintiff's bar but has turned out to be a nightmare in the eyes of most of the plaintiff's bar. Many assume she is laying the groundwork for an eventual run for Governor and currying favor with big money interests.

 7. Jusice Maynard, the one caught "cavorting" on the Riviera  with Blankenship during pendence of the appeal,  was also with his then mistress who just happened to be an employee of the Court.

  8. Justice Starcher who also ultimately agreed to recuse gave interviews in which he referred to Blankenship as, among other things, a "clown" and a "moron" but he stayed on through the initial decision recusing only on rehearing and then as a stated effort to shame Benjamin into recusing.

  That's just a capsule summary, but you get the idea. One od Benjamin's most disingenuous arguments for refusing to recuse was that he had voted against Massey in several other cases. H offered that as proof of his neutrality and impartiality. He neglected to mention that none of cases involved 3-2 decisions and the outcome would have been the same in each regardless of his vote.

   The good news is that of the people mentioned only Benjamin and Davis still remain on the court and the whole sordid episode has led to much more attention being focused on the Court and the acts and omissions of the Justices.  That and Benjamin can now never sit on another case involving Massey or blankenship.

Following accepted principles of our legal tradition respecting the proper performance of judicial functions, judges often inquire into their subjective motives and purposes in the ordinary course of deciding a case. This does not mean the inquiry is a simple one.  "The work of deciding cases goes on every day in hundreds of courts throughout the land. Any judge, one might suppose, would find it easy to describe the process which he had followed a thousand times and more.  Nothing could be farther from the truth."  B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 9 (1921).

In 2002, a 5-4 majority of the U.S. Supreme Court held that states may not prohibit judicial candidates from announcing their views on disputed legal or political issues,1 thereby opening the door to election campaigns filled not only with the prospect of full disclosure of a candidate's views on issues of the day, but also of vigorous and potentially vituperative attacks by interest groups who may not share those views.  

Previously in MN, judicial elections were non-partisan, appointments were non-partisan and merit-based. But the GOP wanted to politicize the elections and campaigns, forcing many of these judges running to accept campaign contributions etc.

See this article for more...('cause I may not have it all exactly right)

Help! MN attys.?

  I do though agree with the minority that ehere will be an increase in recusal motions filed because of connections between judges and litigants (and their attorneys) which create what is claimed to be an unreasonable probability of bias.

 There is a huge gulf between a litigant (or attorney) who made a routine campaign contribution which represents a tiny fraction of contributed funds and a litigant (or attorney who made either a huge campaign contribution (where legal) or established an "independent" committee which spent a huge amount to advocate for the candidate or against an opponent.

  There will be situations where no one can say without litigation which side a particular example falls. Of course, prudent litigants and lawyers will not file recusal motions where it common sense tells them they will lose. It isn't exactly a great tactic essentially to  accuse a judge of bias without a firm basis and then lose the motion and have that judge (who now may be a little pissed off but able to refrain from saying so) preside anyway. obviously, the rule will not evolve to allow for litigants to create the appearance of bias by their own conduct and then get what theywant because of it.

  "The judge is now mad at me because I made a baseless accusation against him. Any reasonable analysis of human psychological motivations would suggest that some people would be upset by being the target of false accusations, so therefore ythe judge must recuse even if there was not initially an unreasonable possibility of bias," isn't going to fly.