Ensuring Lawful Interrogations:

(i)   to study and evaluate whether the interrogation practices and techniques in Army Field Manual 2 22.3, when employed by departments or agencies outside the military, provide an appropriate means of acquiring the intelligence necessary to protect the Nation, and, if warranted, to recommend any additional or different guidance for other departments or agencies; and

"High value information came from interrogations in which those methods were used and provided a deeper understanding of the al Qa'ida organization that was attacking this country,"

I think the argument we are going to hear more and more of, from the usual suspects, is how determined the administration was to prevent another terrorist attack, and so felt justified in using whatever means possible to obtain info that would help them protect the country.

So... I am reading the report; I guess I've read up to the part where they begin to discuss the interrogation of Zubaydah - lots of redactions in that next section.

The real beginning of all of this was the attacks on 9/11 (unless you subscribe to the theory that Bush and Cheney came into office with an intention to go to war).  Administration lawyers were already considering our adherence to the Geneva Conventions, and by December, 2001, the DoD was seeking info on detention and interrogation.  They contacted the agency that oversees the SERE training.

Then, on February 7, 2002, Bush issued a statement that Taliban detainees did not come under the protection of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention, nor were they entitled to POW status, and then it expanded from there.  The report indicates that this policy statement was directed at the US Armed Forces, and that it - the committee - is unaware of any similar statement being directed at other agencies.  However, a February 2, 2002 State Department memo reflected that Administration lawyers involved in the discussion about the GC and CA-3 agreed that the CIA was bound by the same legal restrictions as the US military.

The memo also stated, however, that "CIA lawyers believe[d] that, to the extent that the [Third Geneva Convention's] protections do not apply as a matter of law but those protections are applied as a matter of policy, it is desirable to circumscribe that policy so as to limit its application to the CIA."  Further, "other Administration lawyers involved did not disagree with or object to the CIA's view."  According to the Report, "(M)onths later, in an October 2, 2002 meeting with DoD officials at Guantanamo Bay, Chief Counsel to the CIA's CounterTerrorist Center (CTC) Jonathan Fredman reportedly stated that the `CIA rallied' for the Conventions not to apply."

Right after the DoD's General Counsel's Office was provided with a list of all the SERE techniques - in fact, just one week later - the OLC issued two opinions: one was the "first" Bybee memo that redefined torture, and the other was the "second" Bybee memo that advised the CIA of the legality of specific interrogation techniques.

Before those two memos were drafted, Yoo met with Gonzales and Addington to discuss the subjects that would be addressed in the opinions, but Yoo has refused to say whether he had any info on SERE techniques as he was drafting the memos; Haynes says he did discuss SERE techniques with others in the administration.  And Bybee, who signed the memos, says he did see assessments of the psychological effects of the SERE training when he was meeting in July, 2002 with Yoo and two other OLC attorneys, and that he - Bybee - used the assessment to inform the August 1, 2002 opinion.  And Bybee recalls discussing detainee interrogations with Ashcroft and Yoo in late July, 2002 before signing the OLC opinions.

Following the development and the timeline of this is at the same time fascinating and repulsive; it's like watching evil grow.  What is interesting to note are the ongoing and strong objections by the counsels of all four branches of the military - and how those objections were simply dismissed.

I don't know how much time I will have to continue reading this report, and after reading as much as I have, will probably have to brace myself to do it.

There was one more check on intelligence programs, one designed in the 1970s to make sure independent observers kept an eye on spy agencies: Congress. The Senate and House Intelligence Committees had been created in the mid-1970s to prevent any repeat of the C.I.A. abuses unearthed by the Senate's Church Committee.

As was common with the most secret programs, the C.I.A. chose not to brief the entire committees about the interrogation methods but only the so-called Gang of Four -- the top Republican and Democrat on the Senate and House committees. The rest of the committee members would be fully briefed only in 2006. (here are the 2006 Senate members, and here are the 2006 House members who were briefed.)

The 2002 Gang of Four briefings left a hodgepodge of contradictory recollections that, to some Congressional staff members, reveal a dysfunctional oversight system. Without full staff support, few lawmakers are equipped to make difficult legal and policy judgments about secret programs, critics say.

Representative Nancy Pelosi of California, who in 2002 was the ranking Democrat on the House committee, has said in public statements that she recalls being briefed on the methods, including waterboarding. She insists, however, that the lawmakers were told only that the C.I.A. believed the methods were legal -- not that they were going to be used.

By contrast, the ranking Republican on the House committee at the time, Porter J. Goss of Florida, who later served as C.I.A. director, recalls a clear message that the methods would be used.

"We were briefed, and we certainly understood what C.I.A. was doing," Mr. Goss said in an interview. "Not only was there no objection, there was actually concern about whether the agency was doing enough."

Senator Bob Graham, Democrat of Florida, who was committee chairman in 2002, said in an interview that he did not recall ever being briefed on the methods, though government officials with access to records say all four committee leaders received multiple briefings.

Senator Richard C. Shelby of Alabama, the senior Republican on the committee, declined to discuss the briefings.