Feingold wrote:
For far too long, we have been fighting in Afghanistan with too few troops. It has been an "economy of force" campaign, as the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff put it. But we can't just assume that additional troops will undo the damage caused by years of neglect.
Indeed, most of us agree that the Iraq Debacle did, perhaps irreparable, damage to our efforts in Afghanistan. And Feingold was correct to ask:
After seven years of war, will more troops help us achieve our strategic goals in Afghanistan? How many troops would be needed and for how long? Is there a danger that a heavier military footprint will further alienate the population, and, if so, what are the alternatives? And – with the lessons of Iraq in mind – will this approach advance our top national security priority, namely defeating Al Qaeda?
I believe the answers to these questions are, respectively - (1) yes; (2) I do not know, but at least 30,000 and for at least a few years; (3) Yes, there is a danger that a heavier military footprint will alienate the population but there is a greater danger that the failure of the US to help provide security will also alienate the Afghan population and provide a safe haven to forces that will not only be a direct threat to the US (Al Qaida), but also will be extremely destabilizing to Pakistan, India and the entire region. The reality is that given the threats of severe instability and reforming of direct threats to the US and the region, there are no other short term alternatives. (4) There can be no doubt that this will help us in our struggle with terrorism, imo.
Feingold wrote:
We must target Al Qaeda aggressively, and we cannot allow Afghanistan to be used again as a launching pad for attacks on America. It is far from clear, however, that a larger military presence there would advance these goals.
This is not clear thinking imo. The lessons of Iraq tell us that providing military presence in a theatre where Al Qaida was NOT present did severe damage to our fight in Afghanistan and strengthened the terrorist cause against the US.
But the opposite would be true of our efforts in Afghanistan. We would be bringing to bear military pressure on the terrorist organizations that did attack us and support attacks upon us. It would help stabilize the region and bring needed security to the population. It would provide evidence of our commitment to the region.
In the end, Feingold, it seems to me, misstated the strategy that will be employed in the region:
Regardless of whether we send more troops, we need to understand that, as in Iraq, there is ultimately no military solution to Afghanistan's problems. Unless we push for diplomacy and a regional approach, work to root out corruption, stamp out the country's narcotics trade, and step up development and reconstruction efforts, Afghanistan will probably continue its downward trajectory.
The Obama Administration is already engaged in these actions. In particular, Richard Holbrooke is an energetic and respected diplomat who has been on the job from day one. I am confident that the Obama Administration will take a multifaceted approach to addressing the problems in the region.
In short, the increase in military power in the region is an important and necessary, but not exclusive, part of the the aggressive and proactive strategy the Obama Administration will employ in the region.
Feingold wrote:
In the long run, regional diplomacy, government reforms, and infrastructure development may be more important to Afghanistan's success – and to our own national security – than committing additional troops.
The decision to go to war in Afghanistan was the right one, but after years of misplaced priorities and muddling through, we have to do some hard thinking before asking our military to create the stability and security that are badly needed there.
To say that some non-military initiatives are as important, or even more important, than the military initiative is not an answer for whether a military initiative is also important and necessary. I believe it clearly is and I think Feingold did not offer a compelling argument for why it is not.
Speaking for me only
