This isn't quite as idiosyncratic as an unwary reader might imagine, because a lot of people almost automatically think "why not Elhauge" when almost any legal appointment is announced.

Einer Elhauge is a professor at Harvard Law, and for anyone unfamiliar with the work of probably the closest approximation we have to a universal legal scholar, there's a good introduction at http://media.www.hlrecord.org/media/storage/paper609/news/2003/09/25/News/All-About.Elhague-476806.s html

It's also worth reading at least a small sample of Elhauge's amazingly deep and  original way of approaching questions about anti-trust litigation...

In Antitrust, much turns on how we think firms are likely to behave. After a merger, will firms engage in Bertrand competition by pricing down to cost, Cournot competition by setting output in a way that depends on the output of others, or oligopolistic coordination on price or output? The traditional approach considers various factors that theoretically bear on this issue in particular cases, but the weighing of them generally turns on unavoidable judgment calls. It would be better to rely on the growing statistical analysis of how firms actually behave (often, it turns out, in ways that lie in between these models). It would be even better to have rigorous statistical data about what the price effects were of a particular method for deciding which mergers to approve or condemn. Right now we choose our merger law methodologies based on theory and never gather and analyze the data to see whether the theory worked.