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Why Lehman Brothers Failed

First and foremost, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act had nothing to do with it. Lehman Brothers' financial free fall resulted from its position in the mortgage backed securities market. As an investment bank, Lehman Brothers followed the lead of Salomon Brothers, that invented the non-Fannie/Ginnie Mae mortgage-backed securities business:

An ambitious mail-room clerk named Lew Ranieri worked at S[a]lomon Brothers and saw an opportunity in the mid 80s. S[a]lomon Brothers was hiring rocket scientists to create a new breed of mortgage-backed security, a collateralized mortgage obligation (CMO), designed to more accurately predict the prepayment speed of the mortgages backing the bonds they sold. Lucky Lew ran around the country preaching God, motherhood, baseball, and a CMO in every portfolio. Lew convinced the WORLD investment community that the American homeowner was a damn good bet.

More . . .

It turned out that by 2007, a lot of mortgage-backed securities were not a damn good bet. And Lehman Brothers was completely overexposed in mortgage-backed securities. And the main reason it turned out to be a bad bet was the inability of homeowners to service their mortgages in the "sub-prime mortgage" market. Why that happened is an argument we can have - I mostly blame the performance and policies of the Bush Administration with regard to the economy and financial market regulation. But one thing I believe did not cause it is the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Lehman Brothers did not fail because it engaged in commercial banking. And no commercial bank will fail because it engaged in investment banking.

By Big Tent Democrat, speaking for me only

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    From where I sit (5.00 / 3) (#14)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:30:59 PM EST
    The entire subprime crisis - and, by extension, the Fannie/Freddie crisis, although it's a different thing - hails back to a combination of two factors: the deregulation of the mortgage lending industry, combined with the Fed's decision to crank interest rates all the way down to 1%.  Way, way too many bad loans were written.

    The problem is that deregulation created a world where the disincentive to issue bad loans was removed.  Imagine the opposite, a world of hyper-tight regulation where every bank that issues a mortgage has to keep that loan on its books forever and ever, bearing the risk until satisfaction or default.  Banks would obviously be very very tight with their credit and would avoid risky loans at all costs.

    Whereas in the actual, deregulated world, banks ended up carrying none of the risk themselves.  Instead, mortgages would be instantly bought up and securitized by investment banks such as Lehman.  As those bundled and securitized mortgages pass from hand to hand, people cease to know or care about the degree of risk represented by the underlying mortgages.  And if you're a bank, you don't care whether your loans are risky if there's an investment bank out there willing to instantly buy and securitize 95% of your loans without regard to risk, which is what was actually happening in many cases.

    So Lehman was doing fine carrying all these mortgage-backed securities on its books, for so long as no one in the market knew or cared what they were "really" worth.  Like a rare baseball card, if everyone agrees that it's worth $1000, then it's worth $1000, regardless of its intrinsic value or lack thereof.  But if the market wakes up one day and realizes "hey, wait, baseball cards aren't actually worth anything," suddenly you have an asset that was valued at $1000 on last quarter's balance sheet but now has to be marked to market at something close to the $0 it's worth once no one wants to trade them any longer.

    De Facto Deregulation (5.00 / 1) (#87)
    by santarita on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 06:27:51 PM EST
    Getting Mortgage Loans off the bank's books is not necessarily a bad thing.  It is done to free up capital so that the bank can lend more.  And the bank makes money servicing the loan.  Usually.  Theoretically at least the loan has to meet certain standards before it can be sold and those standards are or should be very similar to the standards that the bank would have for its own loans.

    Many of the problems have been created no so much by de jure deregulation but de facto deregulation, i.e. .  the regulators chose the path of lax enforcement of existing regulations.  And they mistakenly relied on industry self-regulation to do what the regulators weren't doing.  For instance, the FASB standard (140, I think) dictates the criteria for being able to say when a bank no longer has a loan on the books (and hence has the need to count it as risk-based assets).  But that important standard had so many exceptions written into it that a truck could be driven through it.  And the ratings agencies awarded investment grade ratings to securities that should never have been given those ratings.  

    So my own take is that there was a perfect storm brewing of lax enforcement by regulators and a failure of self-regulation.  And I put the blame on Congress as well - primarily the Republican Congress who basically sat on their thumbs for 6 years.

    Parent

    Banks rarely hold mortgages now (none / 0) (#21)
    by MKS on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:34:17 PM EST
    They are just the servicing agents....

    Parent
    Right (5.00 / 1) (#29)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:38:43 PM EST
    The fundamental question, though, is how much of the risk they actually carry in the long run.

    The bank that issues the mortgage is in the best position to assess the degree of risk involved.  They know the borrower, they inspect the premises.  Once the mortgage has been sold off and securitized a dozen different ways, nobody really knows any longer how good the mortgage is.

    It's not that the issuing bank needs to be forever married to the risk associated with the mortgage, but they at least shouldn't be permitted to get a quickie divorce.  As we're now seeing, it's very hard on the kids.

    Parent

    You're largely right, but a few poimts need to (5.00 / 1) (#65)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:16:38 PM EST
    be made a little more clear:

    Banks, in the traditional sense, don't issue or originate a lot of mortgages now.  A lot of that work has been farmed out to "companies" that spring up like so many mushrooms after a rainstorm.  What you have are a couple of guys who can sell stuff to people and they pitch mortgages and refinanaces to anyone.  Your accountant might pitch it to you when you come in for your taxes.  Some telemarketer calls and offers a mortgage.  You know what I'm talking about.  

    I once (going on 7 or 10 years ago, now) worked with another lawyer representing a title company which had set up a whole suite of "companies" to generate mortgages and mortgage re-fis.  They had all sorts of names, but were really run out of the same grove of cubicles.  The different companies kind of specialized in different markets - geographic, ethnic, whatever commonality would allow them to pitch their products.  The mortgages were immediately sold to a servicing agent;  the title companies got their cut from the fees and charges they tacked on.  The involvement of banks was two-fold:  they put together a bundle of cash to make the mortgages work, and they set the criteria for the mortgages.

    The sets of criteria made it possible for the bank (thru some sophisticated mathematical/statistical models) to bundle the mortgages into something similar to a bond.  Remember, a bond is basically a document indicating a debt and a set of terms and conditions of repayment.  And these bundled mortgages bore a certain rate of interest (to be paid to the bondholder) and estimated risk of default.  The latter was based upon history.

    Of course, the history was based upon a more-or-less stable economy with decent jobs paying decent wages and growing at a decent rate over time.  (If, during the sales pitch, Mr. Consumer/borrower questioned these assumptions, he'd be faced with a question like "America has always grown.  Do you think it won't?  Are you un-American?")  The reality of exporting those jobs and wages to low-wage countries never intruded.

    Similarly, the reality of spending a trillion or so dollars trying to capture a couple years' oil production for Big Oil, and where that money would have to come from, and the steady increase in oil and other commodity prices, never intruded.

    The attitude and answer was "the future will take care of itself."  And, as far as the originators were concerned, this was true.  They got their fees and moved on, and they're probably selling cell phones or whatever now.

    Of course, the future is here, now.

    Parent

    Yep. (none / 0) (#69)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:27:37 PM EST
    for about 4 years, '01-05, the guy with the business next to me had a co that sold mortgages, etc. His affinity group were/are LA's latinos.

    He invited me to a party at his house one night and the biggest laugh of the evening was how a bunch of his customer's SS#s came back "deceased." Despite that, he told me he earned about $750k in fees in 2004.

    That said, in about 1990 he did rescue two homeless kids off the streets of Tijuana and spent the next 15 years fighting to get the adoptions legal, so in some respects, anyway, he does have a good heart.

    Parent

    A lot of them have good hearts (5.00 / 1) (#79)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:39:45 PM EST
    and it's just a business for them.  And, a lot of them truly believed and believed in the idea of getting mortgages to those who previously couldn't get one.

    It's not really the borrower's fault if rational predictions underlying their taking out a mortgage don't come to pass.  I mean, people get sick and lose their jobs all the time.  It's when the system sets up people for failure (by charging exorbitant interest, steering them to strange ARMs, 40 year notes, and interest-only mortgages or bait-and-switching them) that things start to fall apart on a systemic basis.

    Which is what we're seeing here.

    Parent

    And... (none / 0) (#92)
    by santarita on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 08:21:08 PM EST
    the title companies that set up these mortgage originators were regulated only by the states and not the feds.  The rush to blame everything on the repeal of Glass-Steagull ignores the fact that large segments of the industry were not subject to the same federal regulatory scrutiny that commercial banks were.

    Parent
    Query: how are the loans (none / 0) (#63)
    by oculus on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:15:58 PM EST
    securitized after the initiating bank sells the loan?  

    Parent
    Well (none / 0) (#70)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:28:47 PM EST
    they basically get bundled by the investment bank that purchases them into one big dollop o' mortgagey goodness.  A typical mortgage-backed security will have a bunch of underlying loans, some good, some not so good.  When you purchase the security, your hope is that even though one or two of the underlying mortgages might go into default, the others will make up for it.

    One of my good friends graduated college a couple years ago and got a good-paying job working for a major investment bank in the mortgage-backed securities department.  Not the best timing, as it happens.  Although getting laid off doesn't feel quite so personal when the entire department ceases to exist!

    Parent

    Once the homeowner's mortage, (none / 0) (#73)
    by oculus on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:32:51 PM EST
    which is secured by the real property, is sold and bundled, is the new investment vehicle no longer secured by the real property?  
    [P.S.  I didn't take either macro or micro econ.!]

    Parent
    No. The mortgage is always secured (none / 0) (#76)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:36:03 PM EST
    by the underlying property.  The issue becomes "who does the nitty-gritty of foreclosures on the defaulting people and who pays for it".  The investors always try to kick that back toward the originators.

    Parent
    Well (none / 0) (#77)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:36:21 PM EST
    as far as I know, the real property always remains subject to the same old mortgage, but that doesn't necessarily mean that the person holding the mortgage-backed security is the one who actually gets charged with carrying out the foreclosure and so forth.  Truth be told, I'm not clear on how all the mechanics work; in my business, I'm more interested in how default affects the value of the security, not in what takes place at the defaulting end of things.

    Parent
    The setups on who does what when there's a (none / 0) (#81)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:41:08 PM EST
    default vary from bundle to bundle and bundler to bundler.

    That's about as clear as I know how to make it.

    Parent

    That is actually an interesting unanswered (none / 0) (#78)
    by steviez314 on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:38:34 PM EST
    question.

    Some local courts have ruled that foreclosure notices are invalid because the "owner" of the mortgage is not in court--no one even knows who the actual owner is, it's in a CMO somewhere.

    The bank is now only a mortgage servicer, and doesn't hold the mortgage.  This could get very interesting as foreclosures increase.

    Parent

    Here's more the problem (none / 0) (#88)
    by Alien Abductee on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 06:29:18 PM EST
    link

    before the arrival of "hyper-finance", if a family wanted a £100,000 mortgage they would go to the Halifax and simply borrow £100,000. Now consider what would have happened in the new financial world. The family would have borrowed £100,000 from Northern Rock, which would sell £100,000 of bonds to hedge funds, which would buy these bonds with £100,000 borrowed from Bear Stearns, their prime broker, which would raise this money by selling £100,000 of commercial paper to Citibank, which would then borrow £100,000 through the inter-bank market from Halifax. The original borrower is still the same household and the ultimate lender is still Haliax, but now a £100,000 mortgage has created £500,000 of new debt.

    I also find that article interesting for its discussion of there being a difference between the "real" economy and what's happening in the financial system. Gloomy, but not quite the gloom of those like Roubini.

    Parent

    They'd use certain "objective criteria" (none / 0) (#74)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:34:21 PM EST
    like credit scores of the borrowers, zip codes, demographics (of the people and/or neighborhoods), whatever they could plug into some very sophisticated models, to come up with some estimate of risk.  The riskier, the more interest the bonds bore (and the higher the underlying interest charged the borrowers).

    That, and the law of large numbers, i.e., if you hold one mortgage you'll worry all the time over whether it will go bad.  If you hold a thousand, you can deal with one or even 10 going bad and thus not worry too much.

    Parent

    A good post (none / 0) (#30)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:38:56 PM EST
    Especially this part:

    The entire subprime crisis - and, by extension, the Fannie/Freddie crisis, although it's a different thing - hails back to a combination of two factors: the deregulation of the mortgage lending industry, combined with the Fed's decision to crank interest rates all the way down to 1%.  Way, way too many bad loans were written.

    The problem is that deregulation created a world where the disincentive to issue bad loans was removed.  Imagine the opposite, a world of hyper-tight regulation where every bank that issues a mortgage has to keep that loan on its books forever and ever, bearing the risk until satisfaction or default.  Banks would obviously be very very tight with their credit and would avoid risky loans at all costs.

    The repeal of Glass-Steagall has nothing to do with that.

    Parent

    The Disincentive to create bad loans... (none / 0) (#93)
    by santarita on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 08:29:56 PM EST
    was more a function of being able to sell these loans on the secondary market.  The secondary market was able to sell mortgage-backed securities where a component was subprime and alt-a.  There was a huge demand for these securities because of their yield.  It wasn't so much a function of deregulation as a function of no regulation for these new types of products.  The incentive to create less than stellar credits was that there was a market that was hungry for these loans.  

    Parent
    Exactly similar thing happened with junk bonds (none / 0) (#98)
    by fairleft on Tue Sep 16, 2008 at 10:54:23 AM EST
    Entirely predictable, a bogus theory pushed by a Wharton MBA and great salespeople suckered us into an economic crisis in the 80s, and now similar MBAs selling another bogus theory sucker us into a far greater crisis now.

    Parent
    Well, in the 1980s, when (5.00 / 1) (#31)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:39:02 PM EST
    Lew convinced the WORLD investment community that the American homeowner was a damn good bet.

    it was an honest statement, because there was a solid base of industrial jobs (paying - gasp - union wages), professional jobs (not being undercut by South Asian/Chinese proofreaders and paralegals and analysts working for 10% of US minimum wage), and actual regulatory checks and balances (making sure that people making crappy loans got run out of the business, rather than getting bonuses).  People could get a mortgage, and have some expectation of paying it back.  Now, everyone's a deadbeat living from paycheck to paycheck - they can be little else - given the way this country's been run into the crapper.

    By 2007, the promises of the 1980s had all gone to hell, courtesy of Republicans like Phil "you're a whiner, not a winner" Gramm rewriting the banking and tax codes and promising more of the same when he's made McSame's economic czar, hedge funds turning everything financial into a more-crooked-than-Vegas-mob-run casino (and getting taxed at 15% rather than 30-something), and Village idiots who traded a little bit of campaign cash for a lot of private profits.

    For years it has amazed me that the most profitable investment for a business owner or industry has not been in people, plant, innovation or product.  It has been in politicians.  The Return on Investment (amount of profit or advantage divided by the amount of campaign cash tossed to the pols) from buying politicians is simply astronomical - better than any legitimate business strategy could have yielded.

    The corollary to that is that, in reality, the cheapest, most roundheeled whores in Washington did not work for Ms. Palfrey's escort service, nor on some seedy streetcorner along 14th street (or wherever the DC red-light district is these days) but rather for you and me, in their exalted offices on Capitol Hill.  Were the Congresscritters eceonomically rational or not just plain stupid, they would demand and get a much higher cut of the profits their changes to law and regulation facilitated.  

    Of course, since it is not in corporate America's interest to disabuse them of their ineconomic folly, we continue to get the Steny Hoyers and Tom DeLays of this world running things.

    And, of course, you also get heir-balls like Bushie coughed up to dance and distract and appoint sorta-responsible people.  And we get accurate commentary like this (from that link):

    The major point appears to be that George W. Bush is not a serious presence in this most serious economic crisis since 1931. But if we take Bob Woodward's book seriously, he was scarcely a serious presence in many of the most important decisions with regard to Iraq, so why should things be different with regard to decisions about the economy. Would any serious person want George W. Bush to be a serious player, anymore than any serious person would want Sarah Palin to be "the Great Decider" with regard to dealing with economic crises?

    Yeah.  I'm cheerful.  

    A big factor (5.00 / 2) (#46)
    by votermom on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:51:16 PM EST
    although not a direct cause is also the lack of accountability of the management (CEOs) to the shareholders.

    For an opposing view (none / 0) (#2)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:22:27 PM EST
    Here is Robert Kuttner arguing that the repeal of Glass-Steagall led to the sub-prime mortgage crisis:

    ROBERT KUTTNER: Well, you know, some people have this picture of subprime lenders as these neighborhood predators. They were put in business by Citigroup. They were put in business by Merrill Lynch. They were put in business by the bluest chip names on Wall Street.

    The prime enabler under Clinton of deregulation was Robert Rubin, Secretary of the Treasury. And Rubin comes out of Goldman Sachs, then he goes to work as one of Clinton's top guys. He presides over the repeal of the key piece of New Deal legislation designed to prevent conflicts of interest, the Glass-Steagall Act. And then he lets a short interval go by, and then he becomes chairman of the executive committee of Citigroup, which was only able to become the kind of conglomerate it did because of the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Now, that's a flat-out conflict of interest.

    And so, what should the big banks do? Well, they should hang their heads in shame. But they're not going to become converts to our view of the economy. We have to impose that on them as citizens through the democratic process of legislation and regulation. We have to fight the battle that we fought in the 1930s and onward and win it all over again, because, otherwise, if we don't, the power of speculative finance is going to just wreck the economy for the rest of us.

    Frankly, Kuttner never explains HOW the repeal of Glass-Steagall led to the subprime mortgage crisis. So there really is not much of ana rgument there in my opinion.

     

    It's it pretty straightforward? (none / 0) (#6)
    by andgarden on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:25:18 PM EST
    Firms like Lehman were no longer held to the same capitalization standards as the old banks. (Of course, just watch WaMu or Wachovia fail. . .)

    Parent
    Perhaps they should have been (none / 0) (#13)
    by andgarden on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:30:43 PM EST
    But where are we without risk. . .?

    Parent
    That, again, (none / 0) (#18)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:32:46 PM EST
    is a different argument.

    Not related to Glass-Steagall.

    Parent

    Well (none / 0) (#22)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:34:40 PM EST
    One of the key arguments for repeal of Glass-Steagall sounded a lot like what we heard from John McCain today - let's get rid of all those antiquated regulations that don't fit today's marketplace, and replace them with a bunch of smarter stuff.  Well, that sounds great, provided part II of the plan actually happens.  But elect the wrong president, or simply allow the political will to dissipate, and what you end up with is a deregulated market and no appetite for the smarter regulations we were promised.

    Parent
    I did not hear McCain today (none / 0) (#34)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:40:18 PM EST
    But if he cited the repeal of Glass-Steagall, I would be surprised.

    Parent
    Heh (none / 0) (#40)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:46:09 PM EST
    Of course he didn't!  I'm just saying that the basic arguments are the same.

    If you're a Republican, some days just aren't good days to argue for deregulation.  Today is one of those days.  So instead, you just argue for "reform" of the existing, outmoded regulations - which equates to deregulation with a promise of enacting better regulations at some future date!  Good luck getting a Republican administration to follow through on that.

    Parent

    I disagree (none / 0) (#42)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:48:24 PM EST
    The Glass Steagall act had a single purpose - keep investment banks and commercial banks separate.

    The commingling of investment banks and commercial banks is not the problem today imo.

    Parent

    Hm (5.00 / 1) (#48)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:51:42 PM EST
    I'm quite confident that one of the arguments for repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act was that it represented an outmoded type of regulation - gosh, in this modern age, no need to preserve an archaic separation between investment banking and commercial banking! - and that what we needed to do was get rid of that antiquated prohibition and simply substitute a more modern regulatory scheme.

    What we got in the end, thanks primarily to Bush's victory in 2000, was the deregulation without the new regulatory scheme.  It's the same bait-and-switch I hear McCain promising today with regard to the financial markets in general.

    Parent

    I do not follow your argument (none / 0) (#56)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:03:49 PM EST
    There was a lack of regulation of the mortgage industry, even the mortgage-backed securities industry.

    Glass-Steagall did not provide that regulation. Its repeal did not effect this lack of regulation.

    In essence, the repeal of Glass-Steagall is irrelevant is my point.

    Parent

    Glass-Steagull was being eroded... (none / 0) (#89)
    by santarita on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 06:47:46 PM EST
    during the 1990's.  Part of the history here is that there were large unregulated companies (insurance companies, GMAC, GE Financing, etc) that were capturing a larger and larger share of the traditional banking market - they were making loans and  setting up investment accounts that acted like checking accounts.  The traditional banks increasingly were having to relying on the investment provision of the National Banking Act in order to take part in capital markets transactions.  it was often like trying to fit a square peg into a round hole.  So in that sense the regulations ere archaic.   The banks convinced Congress and Clinton that it was necessary to eliminate Glass-Steagull so that they could compete on a level playing field with unregulated companies.  It allowed banks to increase their opportunity to diversify their income from primarily interest income to also fee based income.  This allowed them to offer deals similar to what insurance companies and investment companies were doing.

    I've read Kuttner's argument about the importance of the Glass-Steagull Act's removal and I think it is a factor but not the most important factor.  By removing the Glass-Steagull Act, traditional banks could now engage in speculative activities that were contrary to the traditional prudent lending culture.   So to the extent that removal of the Glass-Steagull act permitted banks to get into non-traditional banking activities like investments, yes, that was a factor.  But the lax oversight and failure of internal risk control mechanisms and self-regulation is probably more important.

    Parent

    Sure would be surprised, (none / 0) (#95)
    by cal1942 on Tue Sep 16, 2008 at 01:44:21 AM EST
    it was the Gramm/Leach/Bliley act that repealed much of Glass-Steagall.

    That would be McCain's economic guru Phil Gramm.

    Parent

    A constant theme in McCain's (none / 0) (#61)
    by litigatormom on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:11:53 PM EST
    speeches is "We believe government should get out of your way."

    Of course, while he claims to be talking about small entrepreneurial businesses, he's really talking about getting the government out of corporate America's way, so that market forces can lead us all into greater prosperity.

    As for the little people, I think he believes that they should get out of the government's way.

    Parent

    Actually investment banks do have (none / 0) (#60)
    by Elporton on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:10:42 PM EST
    minimum capital standards, but those standards are substantially below those for commercial banks.

    Parent
    My mistake (none / 0) (#62)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:15:34 PM EST
    Thanks for the correction.

    Parent
    The opposing view is ahistorical (none / 0) (#8)
    by Cream City on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:26:43 PM EST
    and that's the nice word for it, since the sources say that this subprime packaging started in the Reagan and Bush I administrations -- and didn't really take off until the Bush II administration.  In between, it would seem that a wiser president managed, despite Reaganite deregulation, to keep control of the economy. . . .

    Parent
    The Sirota school just hates Rubin and Clinton (none / 0) (#9)
    by andgarden on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:27:32 PM EST
    for other reasons.

    Parent
    More (none / 0) (#11)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:29:13 PM EST
    This post argues that the best argument for Glass-Steagall was this:

    In 1971, in Investment Company Institute v. Camp, no less than the United States Supreme Court would write what stands as the most cogent summary of the reasons for Glass-Steagall:

    Congress was concerned that commercial banks in general and member banks of the Federal Reserve System in particular had both aggravated and been damaged by stock market decline partly because of their direct and indirect involvement in the trading and ownership of speculative securities.

    The legislative history of the Glass-Steagall Act shows that Congress also had in mind and repeatedly focused on the more subtle hazards that arise when a commercial bank goes beyond the business of acting as fiduciary or managing agent and enters the investment banking business either directly or by establishing an affiliate to hold and sell particular investments.

    Many arguments the Supreme Court advanced in support of Glass-Steagall, would prove prophetic three decades later.

    And yet, I see no evidence that the concerns stated therein have proven prophetic at all. Commercial banks that are in trouble are not in trouble due to the fact that they may have a brokerage branch. They are in trouble because they hold bad mortgages.

    Parent

    More from this argument (none / 0) (#16)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:32:07 PM EST
    What can be said in Clinton's favor is that no one in 1999 anticipated the huge growth of the hedge fund industry and the subprime mortgage market. The New York Times described the new financial world created by the repeal of Glass-Steagall in a June 2007 profile of Goldman Sachs:

    While Wall Street still mints money advising companies on mergers and taking them public, real money -- staggering money -- is made trading and investing capital through a global array of mind-bending products and strategies unimaginable a decade ago.

    Again, the connection to Glass Steagall is unstated.


    Parent

    Wait a minute... (none / 0) (#75)
    by Pegasus on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:35:35 PM EST
    Commercial banks that are in trouble are not in trouble due to the fact that they may have a brokerage branch. They are in trouble because they hold bad mortgages.

    Commercial banks can only hold bad mortgages (if by "bad mortgages" you mean bad batches of RMBS, which I assume you do) because they have brokerage branches.

    The fact that commercial banks can now get tied up in bad securities still doesn't mean the G-S repeal created the mess that is sinking Lehman, though.

    Parent

    Take Wachovia for example (none / 0) (#82)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:45:59 PM EST
    It has 125 billion in bad mortgage loans because it bought a lousy sub prime lender in California. It has a thriving brokerage business that is helping to keep it sinking from into bankruptcy.

    If Wachovia did not have a borkerage business, it would be dead.

    I would argue that the repeal of G-S is helping save Wachovia from failing.

    Parent

    Sure, there's an argument to be made there. (none / 0) (#85)
    by Pegasus on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:58:40 PM EST
    And on the other side of that you have WaMu, maybe Citi, maybe even BOA depending on how bad their new Merrill assets actually are... I dunno.  I just feel like ordinary depositors like you and me didn't get on board for this.  I'm not exactly anticipating runs on commercial banks, but it's an ugly scenario that suddenly looks ever-so-slightly conceivable.

    Parent
    it would stink to work for Lehman (none / 0) (#3)
    by andgarden on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:23:19 PM EST
    A friend of a friend does. (Or, um, did. . .)

    From the Times:

    Many employees toyed with their résumés in full view of colleagues. Others perused job-listing Web sites - Wharton's alumni page was popular - and compared notes about headhunters.

    heh.

    I think the traders will mostly land on their feet. But the support staff, etc. . . That's gonna hurt.

    That is different from arguing (none / 0) (#4)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:23:21 PM EST
    the repeal of Glass-Steagall led to this crisis. The Collateralization of mortgages (and car loans and the like for that matter) long predated the repeal of Glass-Steagall.

    The root of the problem (none / 0) (#5)
    by Monda on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:25:09 PM EST
    I think is the sub-prime mortgage crisis.  It's the alpha anyway, and we haven't reached the omega yet.  
    These faulty mortgages and like loans were back-sold to banks (Lehman Brothers, Goldman Sachs, Bear Stearns, etc...) who would then repackage them with various other debts into collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), subsequently sold to investors world-wide via stock markets.
    It's not hard to visualize how the initial collapse quickly ensued. While all this liquidity is being traded, re-traded, and multiplied everyone begins to lose sight of the fact that all this money does not yet physically exist. So, what happens when the borrower goes into foreclosure, and the money never exists? Everyone gets hurt.

    It reminds me of an elaborate, albeit legal pyramid scheme.  And once the bottom is gone, the whole structure collapses.  

    And let me just add (none / 0) (#15)
    by Monda on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:31:29 PM EST
    It was Alan Greenspan who promoted and put in place actually the idea of sub-prime loans.  Furthermore, he lowered interest rates and kept them low for a long period of time.  Compare that to the European Central Bank (which it's actually an inflation bank per se) and refused to lower them to the US level, even though investors, and some governments where begging for the opposite.  

    Also, regulations.  Take Spain for example.  The real estate bubble was huge there, but Spain has draconian laws and regulation when it comes to lending.  20% down period.  

    Parent

    The theory underlying all these (none / 0) (#64)
    by litigatormom on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:16:07 PM EST
    CDOs and other securitized instruments was that the riskiness of any particular mortgage did not have to be examined, because a few foreclosures in the underlying pool of mortgages would not materially affect the value of the pool.

    Apparently, no one thought about what would happen if a lot of the mortgages in the underlying pool went bad. Instead, everyone treated these things like a license to print money, and didn't worry about the risks at all.

    Kind of like what happened with auction-rate securities.  No one ever thought that the much-touted liquidity of the securities would dry up and the auctions fail; thus, no one really focused on the underlying risks of the security itself.  Everyone just assumed that they'd always be able to get rid of them whenever they felt like it.

    Parent

    You're right when you say (none / 0) (#72)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:30:06 PM EST
    the riskiness of any particular mortgage did not have to be examined, because a few foreclosures in the underlying pool of mortgages would not materially affect the value of the pool.

    That, in part, b/c the bundles had provisions which either sent the "bad" mortgages back to the originator for collection/foreclosure, kicking them out of the bundle, or in which the bundle-holder did the collection/foreclosure themselves and then took the costs and losses out of the originator's hide.  But when, as you say,


    no one thought about what would happen if a lot of the mortgages in the underlying pool went bad

    you hit it right on the head.  And those mortgages going south in large numbers are a reflection of bad fundamentals in the economy as a whole.

    Parent

    "First and foremost, (none / 0) (#12)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:30:06 PM EST
    First and foremost, the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act had nothing to do with it.
    If you say so.
    Aside from signaling the end of an era for Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch, this weekend's activity definitively drew a line at the end of another historical era: the Age of Glass-Steagall.


    Well (none / 0) (#19)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:33:45 PM EST
    There's an argument - a Newsweek headline.

    Is that all you got?

    Parent

    Dispute it. (none / 0) (#23)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:34:46 PM EST
    If you can.

    Parent
    Actually I embrace it (none / 0) (#26)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:36:57 PM EST
    It is a good article, It certainly does not argue that the repeal of Glass Steagall led to the submortgage crisis.

    Parent
    Actually (none / 0) (#24)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:36:12 PM EST
    The article is pretty good. Maybe you need to read it before citing it as an argument against me.

    Parent
    Don't be shy, (none / 0) (#28)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:38:20 PM EST
    show us where it says "G-S had nothing to do with Lehman Bros."

    Parent
    It doesn't (5.00 / 1) (#32)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:39:28 PM EST
    Nor does it say the opposite.

    Parent
    And more: (none / 0) (#20)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:34:13 PM EST
    Personally, I believe Congress made a huge mistake in 1999 when it repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, which prohibited commercial banks from engaging in investment activities. Under Glass-Steagall, customers went to a brokerage house for investments and kept cash and savings in institutions that were unaffected or at least less affected by ups and downs in the stock market.

    Glass-Steagall was replaced by Sarbanes-Oxley, which was supposed to increase transparency in the investment industry and corporate America at large. Instead, it allowed banks and investment houses to create new "vehicles," such as the packaging of mortgage loans into investments that were sold as soon as the loans were made. This prompted the mortgage industry to give out mortgage loans to all comers, whether they were qualified or not. This helps explain how mortgages in default now account for 9 percent of all American mortgages.



    Parent
    Someone is going to make a lot of money (none / 0) (#33)
    by MKS on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:39:39 PM EST
    In the early 90s, it was Colony Capital which gobbled up bad loans paying 60 cents on the dollar and realizing 80 cents on the dollar.  "Cash for trash," they called it....

    Parent
    Dat be true mon. (none / 0) (#49)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:53:35 PM EST
    Thomas Barrack of Colony Capital (none / 0) (#50)
    by MKS on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:55:09 PM EST
    had this to say earlier this year:

    STANFORD GRADUATE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS --Expect the volatility that has socked financial markets for the past several months to continue unabated, Thomas Barrack Jr., the founder, chairman, and chief executive office of Colony Capital, a private equity real estate company headquartered in Los Angeles, told the Principal Investment Conference at the Stanford Graduate School of Business

    Barrack also bailed out Michael Jackson, buying his loan earlier this year....

    Barrack was quoted about a year ago iirc that he was agahst at how reckless some real estate investors were--this coming from one of the brashest people in the business....  

    Parent

    Although, to be fair, (none / 0) (#35)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:42:27 PM EST
    the Community Reinvestment Act is also to blame, along with several, perhaps, many other players...

    Parent
    You are mistaken (none / 0) (#38)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:44:10 PM EST
    Sarbanes-Oxley did NOT permit:

    the packaging of mortgage loans into investments that were sold as soon as the loans were made.

    The securitization of mortgages and other debt instruments long predated both the repeal of Glass-Steagall and the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.  

    Parent

    I'm mistaken? (none / 0) (#45)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:51:08 PM EST
    It's someone else's quote.

    Hey, there are many who disagree with you. Just google "lehman glass steagall."

    But a significant part of Lehman's problem doesn't stem from Fuld's management -- it's because the firm suffered collateral damage from Washington's decision a decade ago to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act, adopted during the Great Depression to separate investment banking from commercial banking.
    imo, the important question on this blog is: why are you so adamantly opposed to the repeal of G-S having ANYthing to do with Lehman?

    Parent
    What collateral damage? (none / 0) (#51)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:55:31 PM EST
    Can you write a sentence that includes more than an unsupported assertion? Can you quote a sentence that does?

    What happened regarding Lehman Brothers did would NOT have happened if Glass-Steagall was NOT repealed?

    Name one thing.

    Parent

    why (none / 0) (#52)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:57:03 PM EST
    why are you so adamantly opposed to the repeal of G-S having ANYthing to do with Lehman?

    Parent
    What does it matter if I am? (none / 0) (#53)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:58:50 PM EST
    I get your drift, you think I have some undisclosed conflict. I can say that I have none that I know of and would gladly disclose any I have.

    But what is the problem with asking you to back up your assertion that it does have something to do with it?

    Is the problem that you can't?


    Parent

    Then why even bring the subject up? (none / 0) (#55)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:01:54 PM EST
    Bonnie Erbe did not even know that there were mortgage backed securities in the 80s.

    I like to push back against ignorance.

    Parent

    Seems like waaaay out of the blue, (none / 0) (#58)
    by sarcastic unnamed one on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:08:32 PM EST
    but ok.

    Parent
    Glass-Steagull was not... (none / 0) (#91)
    by santarita on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 08:03:53 PM EST
    replaced by Sarbanes-Oxley.  SOX was enacted in response to the Enron debacle.

    Parent
    Privatizing Social Security (none / 0) (#17)
    by MKS on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:32:32 PM EST
    can't look good to anyone except McCain and Bush right now.

    Paul Volker was an inflation hawk.....Raising interest rates now would be very hard on the economy.....But Volker may be the historical precedent....In the late 70s/early 80s, we had inflation because of the oil embargo....and also high unemployment....Volker raised interest rates driving the economy into a deep recession but taming inflation......With the current oil shocks, we could have stagflation again....

    The current failure of what Krugman calls the shadow banking system is very troubling.  The Great Depression was by most accounts caused, or made much worse, by the banking failures that contracted the money supply.  Bernanke's forte as a scholar was the Great Depression and concern over deflation.....If he is consistent in that concern, he will work to prop up the investment houses and keep credit flowing by not raising interest rates.....  

    The author of the cited (none / 0) (#25)
    by eric on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:36:45 PM EST
    blog post can attempt to minimize it, but the fact remains that the U.S.'s fourth largest investment bank, a bank that survived the Great Depression, has declared bankruptcy.  Bear Stearns was just bailed-out.  Merrill Lynch was barely saved from disaster by Bank of America. Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs are big question marks.

    More is going on here than a $3,000 hit to my 401K.

    Nonsequitor (none / 0) (#27)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:37:46 PM EST
    Something bad happened. The repeal of Glass-Steagall is not why it happened.

    Try paying attention.

    Parent

    What? (5.00 / 1) (#37)
    by eric on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:44:08 PM EST
    I was commenting on the cited blog post by Brian Brady.  I didn't think it was too off-topic to comment on a cited article.  Is it?

    Jeez.  I try to obey the rules and comment in a productive manner here.  "Try to pay attention"?  That's harsh.

    Parent

    I thought you were referring (none / 0) (#39)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:46:07 PM EST
    to my post. It helps if you identify what you are discussing.

    Parent
    I see (none / 0) (#43)
    by eric on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:48:58 PM EST
    I did use refer to the "cited" blog post, but you are right, I could have been more clear.

    Parent
    When the fed kept upping interest (none / 0) (#36)
    by nellre on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:43:56 PM EST
    The fed caused the housing crash by failure to understand their several straight interest hikes would destroy the one booming thing happening in the the economy.. the housing market.
    When they did it I just groaned. How could they be so stupid (but then what do I know?)
    Then it happened.
    The Feds did this.
    If property values held, then those holding the weird mortgages could still sell. Now, no way.

    Well (5.00 / 1) (#44)
    by Steve M on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:49:10 PM EST
    The problem was moreso that a ton of bad loans got written when the interest rates were really low.

    You are correct, of course, that the situation unraveled as a result of the interest rates going back up, but the alternative was keeping them low and seeing even more bad loans get written.  Keeping the interest rates at 1% would only have postponed the crisis, and made it that much more painful when the day came.  Interest rates never should have been at 1% in the first place, not in an absurdly deregulated lending market.

    Parent

    The boom had to bust (none / 0) (#90)
    by nellre on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 06:54:52 PM EST
    But if they fixed it before they busted the bubble, it would have helped.
    It would have required planning however.

    Parent
    A pedestrian question... (none / 0) (#41)
    by FoxholeAtheist on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:47:30 PM EST
    So why aren't people on Main Street totally up in arms, turning to the Democrats en masse and demanding a 21st century New Deal?

    Does the availability of revolving credit still give consumers the illusion that they're going to get by?

    Thanks. I thought I was completely (none / 0) (#54)
    by FoxholeAtheist on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 04:59:17 PM EST
    out on a limb with that theory. I put it out there earlier today on another thread.

    You said:

    Now they [consumers] can buy more and more lines of credit... eventually, credit programs will be stripped, and then there won't be any credit to buy all the things that they used to buy.

    Are the number of lines of credit continuing to rise? Are they higher than 2-3 years ago?

    Under what circumstances would credit programs be stripped?

    Parent

    One of the great lessons of the (none / 0) (#67)
    by scribe on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:24:23 PM EST
    Great Depression was "keep their bellies full".  Almost all sorts of economic policies over the last 75 years have - at their ur-base - had that underlying mantra.

    The issues of economic inequality and the whys and wherefores did not hit home in the 1930s until people were literally starving.  The average person does not understand high finance (if he or she did, they'd be bankers, too), but they do understand being hungry.

    Since the Great Depression, keeping people at some level of being fed - and thus out of the streets and not demanding change - has caused our Ag policies (which provide surpluses) to be the way they are, our transportation policies (to get the food from farm to table) to be the way they are, and so on.

    Too few people today have direct memory of those days, and too few of my 40something generation listened to the stories of making a bowl of tomato soup from the leavings in a bottle of ketchup, and so on.

    The bad times won't really have hit, until you see only skinny people in the projects.

    Parent

    I think you're correct (none / 0) (#59)
    by Pegasus on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:10:27 PM EST
    about Glass-Steagall not being a cause of what's going on in the mortgage securities market.  Really, there's not much logic at all behind the claims of those who want to blame it on the G-S repeal.

    On a separate note but along the same lines, though, I do still worry some about deposit security.  For example, WaMu is pretty heavily involved in bad securities, and IIRC only about a third of their commercial banking deposits are federally insured.  So if they go belly-up overnight, well, who knows what happens.  Extremely unlikely, but then again this whole mess has been unlikely.

    And if there is a run on WaMu, Gramm-Leach-Bliley would bear some of the blame.

    A good article in support of the post (none / 0) (#66)
    by vicndabx on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:19:39 PM EST
    IMO, can be found here: Frontline - Secret History of the Credit Card.  

    Specifically, the discussion in this paragraph (none / 0) (#83)
    by vicndabx on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:47:58 PM EST
    Mortgaging the Future

    Interest rate deregulation dovetailed neatly with a seemingly unrelated phenomenon: the bidding war for suburban housing. The mortgage industry shook off its interest rate regulations just a few years after the credit card industry. In the new world of unfettered mortgage lending, no longer would the middle-class family be restricted to a conventional 80 percent mortgage. The floodgates were opened, and families could get all the mortgage money they ever dreamed of to bid on that precious home in the suburbs -- even if the price tag was more than they could realistically afford.

    Note, this article was posted back in 2004.

    Parent

    This is the best ... (none / 0) (#68)
    by Robot Porter on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:26:01 PM EST
    simple explanation of what the repeal of Glass-Steagal has done in the issue of subprime crisis:

    Glass-Steagall was replaced by Sarbanes-Oxley, which was supposed to increase transparency in the investment industry and corporate America at large. Instead, it allowed banks and investment houses to create new "vehicles," such as the packaging of mortgage loans into investments that were sold as soon as the loans were made. This prompted the mortgage industry to give out mortgage loans to all comers, whether they were qualified or not. This helps explain how mortgages in default now account for 9 percent of all American mortgages.

    With Lehman, the question isn't who created MSBs, it's why were MSBs over-valued.  And THAT is due to subprime market which exists because of the repeal of Glass-Steagall.

    Could this problem been solved without re-enacting Glass-Steagall?  Yes.

    But with Glass-Steagal still in place it wouldn't have happened.

    Without the subprime crisis no failure of Lehman.  Without the repeal of Glass-Steagall no subprime lenders, hence no crisis.

    It's really quite simple.

    MBSs ... I meant (none / 0) (#71)
    by Robot Porter on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:29:10 PM EST
    I don't buy the argument (none / 0) (#80)
    by Pegasus on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:40:35 PM EST
    that the alphabet soup of securitization innovations that precipitated all of this wouldn't have happened but for the repeal of G-S.  That stuff was all going on before '99; it only exploded this decade because the Bush Fed's monetary policies were so batsh*t crazy.

    Parent
    The article is just wrong (none / 0) (#84)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 05:48:18 PM EST
    on the facts.

    Scribe explains it.

    Parent

    It's a matter of degree ... (none / 0) (#96)
    by Robot Porter on Tue Sep 16, 2008 at 02:59:50 AM EST
    but to suggest deregulation, including the repeal of Glass-Steagall, played no role is just beyond moronic.

    Yes, there are systemic problems in the economy (largely the destruction of the manufacturing base) which have created the over-reliance on financial services as a wealth generating tool.

    And new regulation alone won't solve these systemic problems.

    But that's not the same thing as saying that deregulation didn't play a role.

    Parent

    Does anyone remember the 125% home loan? (none / 0) (#86)
    by Militarytracy on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 06:04:17 PM EST
    You could get a 125% loan on the overinflated appraisal on a home during the housing bubble.  I should have gotten one of those and demanded a bailout!  But I have morals and I did get passing grades in economics so chit!

    In my opinion it was the government ignoring the creation of the new investment vehicles that were the packages of all these loans.  I remember six months ago when scholarly pukes actually tried to claim they fully did "not understand" these new investment vehicles - so we all needed to calm down and stop getting so bent out of shape about this.....investment vehicles.....they crack me up!  Suddenly banks weren't holding their own loans so why should they worry if those loans were secured in reality?  You make a bunch of loans and then you sell them and if you weren't making a killing off of it you were a fool because the guy in the next cubicle was!  Investors were told to not worry about foreclosure because there wouldn't wholesale foreclosures, everybody knows that you have a few but mortgages were a good risk (once upon a freshly bundled time), so the bundles were a good thing.  In order to make more bundles to sell though you had to make more mortgages, after awhile qualifying for the loans ceased to matter when just creating the mortgages is where your bread and butter came from. The creators of those bad mortgages were miles away from the possible explosion, they had no worries.

    One day, someone will admit that (none / 0) (#94)
    by stefystef on Mon Sep 15, 2008 at 11:30:39 PM EST
    the housing market was totally manipulated to over price housing and create the housing frenzy that would fuel the mortgage brokers to sell securities products on a market that was false in the first place.

    The houses were overpriced, especially in poor and middleclass communities!  And now, prices are going DOWN to what they should have been in the first place.  In the mean time, many people are paying mortgages higher than the actually value of the property.  Hence, the foreclosure frenzy.

    Human beings need laws and regulation.  Without it, our natural inclination to greed and dominance takes over.  This is Bush's fault for presenting changes in the legislation regulating mortgage lending and I TOTALLY BLAME the U.S. Congress (the Dems especially) for allowing Bush to get away with so much.

    Now, will Americans identify this crisis with McCain???  Will they think Obama has what it takes to fix this???  Only time will tell.  Let's see how this "crisis" plays out in the polls by the end of the week.

    monda, you hit the nail (none / 0) (#97)
    by cpinva on Tue Sep 16, 2008 at 07:36:04 AM EST
    right square on the head.

    It reminds me of an elaborate, albeit legal pyramid scheme.  And once the bottom is gone, the whole structure collapses.  

    that's exactly what the whole sub-prime, mortgage-backed securities industry became. once that first card was pulled from the bottom, the rest of the stack collapsed.

    BTD's correct, the repeal of G-S had nothing whatever to do with the current mess, a mess made possible by the oveweaning greed of the firms themselves, and the politicians (mostly republican) that have ennabled them for the past 8 years.

    rest assured, the partners of lehman, and the others, will do just fine, they got their money already. it's everyone else that will ultimately get shafted.