My post is about Sunstein's views on Roie, not what the political implications of Roe are in this election.

My understanding of most reasonable strict constructionists is that if these rights are so important as to be deemed constitutional right, then they should be IN the Constitution.  To be perfectly honest, I think these rights ARE that important and that they should be in the Constitution.  Actually amending the Constitution is a difficult process (as the Founders intended) but would insure that the majority of America agreed with those amendments.  When it is taken out of the People's/Legislature's hands, and done by judicial fiat... well, we know where that has led.

If someone can point me to the passage in the Constitution that discusses privacy I will accept BTD's argument.  My argument might not ultimately be a winner (who knows) but at least Liberty is a concept within the four corners of the Constitution... which gives it a stronger underpinning that Privacy which was defined via judicial precedents.

Then we manage to act shocked that other American's don't accept our position.

I guess I am just old-fashioned and want to convince people I am right and have the full support of the Constitution for my actions.

Sunstein's position are the extreme conservative position on a myriad of issues.

You clearly know nothing about Sunstein and what is considered progressive legal theory.

Look, if a Republican appoints Sunstein, fantastic.

That a Democrat might is an outrage.

I find the attacks on Roe from the academy to be among the silliest bits of trash I have read in the realm of scholarship.

It is one thing to say, "I would not have done it that way." But the scholarship pretends that was done in Roe was not done since John Marshall.

After decades of assault on the jurisprudence of the Warren Court, many progressive legal scholars have lost faith in judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. Some have responded by embracing popular constitutionalism and advocating mobilization against the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts; others, chastened, urge a minimalist jurisprudence that will avoid giving any group offense. There is fear of provoking the kind of backlash that many associate with Roe, which is often regarded as having caused the rise of the New Right. In this article, we offer a new account of the relationship between adjudication and popular constitutionalism, which we call democratic constitutionalism. Democratic constitutionalism affirms both the need for judicially enforced rights and the fundamental significance of popular constitutional engagement.

We begin from the understanding that, in the American tradition, constitutional politics and constitutional law depend on one another, however insistently they assert their autonomy. This article offers an account of democratic constitutionalism which emphasizes the interdependence of judicial and popular enforcement of constitutional rights, despite perpetual friction between them. Judicially enforceable rights give concrete and institutional form to constitutional values; ongoing popular constitutional engagement ensures that these values retain democratic legitimacy.

Interpretive disagreement is a normal condition for the development of constitutional law. We identify understandings and practices that enable citizens to make claims on the Constitution and government officials to resist and respond to their claims; these interactions shape the Constitution's meaning over time in ways that sustain citizen engagement in our constitutional order and reconcile Americans' competing commitments to the rule of law and to self-governance.

We draw on these understandings to question leading accounts of backlash featured in the work of Michael Klarman, William Eskridge, and Cass Sunstein. Each of these theorists tends in his own way to overestimate the costs of backlash and to underestimate its benefits. They are each attuned to the harms that attend constitutional conflict, but they do not sufficiently consider how citizen engagement in constitutional contestation can contribute to social cohesion in a normatively heterogeneous polity.

Roe symbolizes the fears of those who counsel courts to avoid controversy. Legal scholars and political commentators commonly assert that judicial overreaching produced Roe rage, arguing that legislatures might have liberalized access to abortion if only the Court had stayed its hand. We examine scholarship on Roe's reception, as well as primary sources of the era, which together undermine this conventional account. Backlash to Roe was not just about judicial overreaching. Political mobilization against the decision expressed opposition to abortion's liberalization that began in state legislatures years before Roe was decided. As importantly, backlash to Roe was not just about abortion. During the 1970s, opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment and the school prayer decisions condemned the abortion right as an expression of "secular humanism," giving birth to the coalition politics we now associate with Roe rage - a broad-based social movement hostile to legal efforts to secure the equality of women and the separation of church and state. Roe rage opposes ideals of individualism and secularism that lie at the foundation of our modern constitutional order. Accommodating resistance to Roe thus presents normative questions analogous to those posed by accommodating resistance to Brown.

The article concludes by illustrating how the themes of Roe rage have recently found expression in the Supreme Court's opinion in Carhart.

It is not the predominant view at all.

Legal scholars and students with no political ax to grind believe Roe is a badly WRITTEN opinion, not that it is a badly REASONED opinion.

Indeed, since all the predictions of the demise of the logic of Roe ( O'Connor's famous "Roe is on a collision course with itself" line) have proven to be silly (the viability line remain around 24 weeks), the so called views you champion as the "predominant" view have fallen by the wayside.

Roe Discussions bring out lots of people for many reasons.

And I think what I brought up may having little to do with the reasoning behind Roe, but have everything to do with how society and Roe have shaped each other, the context we find ourselves in 2008, and the election.

It has to do with how I as a layman, can be upset with Sunstein on wiretapping, but find his comments re: Roe to be reasonable.

Some states allowed abortion, some states didn't. Most states had some sort of restrictions on it. Roe-v-Wade declared it to be a federal issue, thus igniting the culture wars.

Beyond that, Ginsburg is simply wrong. There must be an underlying right to even invoke the EPC. Ginsburg is simply nonsensical on this question.