I think they have a service of process problem, in the first place, in spite of the publicity this has garnered.  

To summarize the case, a Swiss bank's branch in the Cayman Islands (jeesh) was alleged to be doing a good deal of high-level (or high-quality) money laundering.  For whom, it's uncertain.  The Swiss bank alleges that the documents were leaked by a "disgruntled former employee", i.e., the VP in charge of that branch.  That person has steadfastly denied being the leaker.

The bank started the suit against Wikileaks and Dynadot, filing an order to show cause seeking the injunctive relief.  Dynadot and the Bank came to an agreement on how to settle their dispute which, if you read the order as signed, includes a complete dismissal of the suit against Dynadot.  

The bank's lawyers gave Wikileaks a couple hours notice, via email, of the suit itself and the hearing at which the order (agreed-to between the bank and Dynadot) was entered.  This, despite having had the order before the judge for some days.  This is what I'd call "sharp practice" (i.e., disfavored).  If this were a regular lawsuit for just money damages (since it has an order to show cause, it isn't), in my opinion using e-mail would be a constitutionally-dubious method for service of process unless there is a separate order in the case file under F.R.Civ.P. 4 authorizing it.

All service must give the party sued "notice" and "an opportunity to be heard".

My 2008 Rules book has the following comment on Rule 4:

Recently, and cautiously, courts have, on occasion, ordered alternate service of provess by electronic mail (e-mail) in cases involving international defendants with a known email address, engaged in internet activities, and attempting to evade service by other means.  Noting the many complications with e-mail service (e.g., an inability to confirm actual receipt of an e-mail message, system compatability issues, possible failure of attachments [such as exhibits] to transmit, be received, or be "opened" in comprehensible form, etc.), courts have granted e-mail service only upon a proper balancing, on a case-by-case basis, of these limitations against the corresponding benefits of such service in particular circumstances.

The comment also cites to a case, Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio In'tl Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2002), which is also to be found on the 9th Circuit's opinion site, here.  It's an easy read.  While that opinion notes that e-mail as a means of service of process can be constitutionally acceptable, it also states:  "We note, however, that, except for the provisions recently introduced into Rule 5(b), email service is not available absent a Rule 4(f)(3) court decree."

In other words, if the bank did not get a court order authorizing service by e-mail, they'd have failed to effect service of process.  

Now, as to orders to show cause, while the principles of notice and opportunity to be heard are the same, the procedure's a little different, because the rules (particularly Rule 65) do permit entry of an order such as this without notice, i.e., ex parte.  But, in those cases, Rule 65(d)(2) limits its binding effect only to the parties "...who receive actual notice of it by personal service or otherwise."

The problem here for the plaintiff being it seems an open question whether they need a separate order to serve via e-mail when proceeding under Rule 65, as opposed to under Rule 4 (where it's clear they do).

But, going back to the plaintiff's "sharp practice" I criticized, the amount of time they gave Wikileaks (a couple hours), does not seem to me to be sufficient.  My Rules book tells me that in Granny Goose Foods v. Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 70, 415 U.S. 423, 433 n.7 (1974), the Supreme Court held that same-day notice of a preliminary injunction was inadequate under Rule 65 (which is probably why the plaintiff's lawyers here styled it as a "permanent injunction").  While circuits appear to differ, the consensus seems that at least three days notice of the hearing would be required.  

And, I'm dubious about whether the specificity of the "irreparable harm" alleged (needed, per Rule, to support an ex parte order) is sufficient.