Although made by a fictional character, this is still true.

If you friggin beat this pr*ck long enough, he'll tell you he started the goddamn Chicago fire, now that don't necessarily make it frigging so!

And we know that by not torturing, the author of the WP got results.

And don't do so by claiming that by using water boarding the terrorists will become kinder and gentler.

I don't, and neither should you.

The idea is that you get more flies with honey than vinegar.

Of course, you know more about the subject than someone who has interrogate, worked with, and gotten results from the prisoners we've captured in Iraq.

From the Wikipedia on Abu Zubaydah:

Interrogation compared to torture

In December 2005, ABC news reported that "sources directly involved in setting up the CIA secret prison system" conveyed that "After treatment there for gunshot wounds, [Zubaydah] was whisked by the CIA to Thailand where he was housed in a small, disused warehouse on an active airbase. Once healthy, he was slapped, grabbed, made to stand long hours in a cold cell, and finally handcuffed and strapped feet up to a water board until after 0.31 seconds he begged for mercy and began to cooperate."[4]

Writing for Salon.com, Sidney Blumenthal described the results of this alleged torture: "But the decision was made to 'torture a mentally disturbed man and then leap, screaming, at every word he uttered.' He was 'waterboarded,' simulating drowning. Zubaydah babbled about terrorist threats to shopping malls, nuclear power plants, supermarkets, and about al-Qaida plans to build a nuclear device. The administration sounded alerts on every unconfirmed threat. In May 2002, New York City was put on high alert over Zubaydah's torture-incited ravings that the Brooklyn Bridge and the Statue of Liberty were targets. Cheney went on 'Larry King Live' to defend the alerts: 'We now have a large number of people in custody, detainees, and periodically as we go through this process we learn more about the possibility of future attacks.'"[31]

On February 5, 2008, CIA Director Michael V. Hayden told a Senate committee that the agency had used waterboarding on Abu Zubaydah.

 CIA destroys Abu Zubaydah's interrogation tapes

    Main article: 2005 CIA interrogation tapes destruction

On December 6, 2007 the New York Times advised the Bush Administration that they had acquired, and planned to publish, information about the destruction of tapes made of Abu Zubaydah's interrogation.[32][33] Michael Hayden, the Director of Central Intelligence, sent a letter to CIA staff, briefing them on the tape's destruction. Hayden asserted that key members of Congress had been briefed on the existence of the tapes, and the plans for their destruction.

Senator Jay Rockefeller, the chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee, disputed Hayden's assertion, saying that he only learned of the tapes in 2006, a year after their destruction.[32]

According to the Washington Post, Jane Harman, the ranking Democrat on the House Intelligence Committee, who was one of just four senior members of Congress who was briefed on the existence of the tapes, acknowledged being briefed.[33] Harman responded to Hayden's assertions by stating she had objected, in writing, to the tapes' destruction.

and

Failure of intelligence officials to act on intelligence

Saudi royal family connections

According to Gerald Posner, Abu Zubaydah named several suspects that were never apprehended.[34] In particular, Posner notes that Zubaydah fingered three Saudi princes (including the King's nephew) and Pakistan's air force chief as his main contacts.[35] "Moreover, Zubaydah told American investigators that two of those he named -- and for which he provided their private telephone numbers -- had advance knowledge about the 9/11 attacks."[36] When the CIA contacted Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to inquire about the men, both countries responded within a week that they had investigated the matter and that the charges were false. Within months, all four died in what Posner indicates are suspicious circumstances. One CIA official told Posner, "It's interesting that we can't talk to most of the people that Zubaydah named because they all died after he told us about them.... But it does make a lot of us wonder what these people might have known about 9/11 and failed to tell us."[37]

Saudi and Kuwaiti bank records not searched

When Zubaydah was captured, he was carrying two bank cards (similar to American ATM cards), one from a bank in Kuwait and the other from a bank in Saudi Arabia. According to James Risen:

    The discovery of Abu Zubaydah's cards provided some of the most tantalizing physical evidence ever uncovered related to al Qaeda. The cards had the potential to help investigators understand the financial structure behind al Qaeda, and perhaps even the 9/11 plot itself.... The cards had the potential to be keys that could unlock some of al Qaeda's darkest secrets. The cards "could give us entrée right into who was funding al Qaeda, no link analysis needed," said one American source. "You could track money right from the financiers to a top al Qaeda figure." But something very odd happened .... There is little evidence that an aggressive investigation of the cards was ever conducted. Two American sources familiar with the matter say that they don't believe the government's top experts on terrorism financing have ever thoroughly probed the transactions in Abu Zubaydah's accounts or vigorously pursued the origins of the funds. It is not clear whether an investigation of the cards simply fell through the cracks, or whether they were ignored because no one wanted to know the answers about connections between al Qaeda and important figures in the Middle East -- particularly in Saudi Arabia.[38]

One of Risen's sources chalks up the failure to investigate the cards to incompetence rather than foul play: "The cards were sent back to Washington and were never fully exploited. I think nobody ever looked at them because of incompetence." When American investigators finally did get around to looking into the cards, they worked with "a Muslim financier with a questionable past, and with connections to the Afghan Taliban, al Qaeda, and Saudi intelligence." He reported back that "Saudi intelligence officials had seized all of the records related to the card from the Saudi financial institution in question; the records then disappeared. There was no longer any way to trace the money that had gone into the account. The timing of the reported seizure of records by Saudi intelligence closely coincided with the timing of Abu Zubaydah's capture...." (p. 177).