Now that Senator Craig has agreed to resign, why would he bother with appealing the case?  Wouldn't the prosecutor prefer to go ahead with a trial, rather than cut a deal, thereby encouraging everyone else who has entered similar pleas to come back to court?

Let's assume that Craig has, consistent with Sen. Specter's advice, decided to face the risk of being re-charged with the more serious peeping count (a "gross misdemeanor," in the double entendre language of the Minnesota law, as opposed to the ordinary misdemeanor of disorderly conduct to which Craig pleaded guilty) and to face the additional risks that a trial would produce publicity and possibly new facts which would be even more embarrassing.

Let's assume further that a very glib lawyer can find a way to frame the motion to withdraw the plea that sidesteps the whole question of how Craig was possibly prejudiced by the form's failure to repeat what he already had been told when the arresting officer Mirandized him.  (Never mind that he's been voting on revisions to 18 U.S.C. as a senator for twenty years and that every American not in a coma for the last thirty years knows those rights from TV.)

Let's further assume that based on his claim of factual innocence, a trial judge is willing to find that he's met the "manifest injustice" standard of Rule 15.05.

The plea was accepted and the conviction entered on August 8th.  But no motion for new trial (or, more properly since this was a plea, to vacate the judgment) was filed within 15 days thereafter, which seems to be what Rule  26.04 requires. Nor was a notice of appeal filed within 10 days, which appears from Rule 28.02 to be the deadline for ordinary misdemeanor convictions (as opposed to a very generous 90 days for gross misdemeanors and felonies).

Hasn't the trial court lost plenary power already? Hasn't the conviction become final and unappealable as a matter of law just based on the calendar?

Isn't Craig now restricted to some sort of out-of-time collateral attack?

Of course, I'm not admitted in Minnesota, and my Westlaw subscription doesn't include their cases. But isn't it likely that Minnesota, like most states, will require an even higher showing than "manifest injustice" for a collateral attack? Isn't it essentially certain that instead of cutting the defendant some slack and letting him dodge the "prejudice" angle (which a sympathetic trial judge might permit for a pro se defendant as part of a direct, timely attack), any trial or appellate court considering a collateral attack is going to insist on Craig's testimony that he was, in fact, unaware of his right to counsel (including court-appointed counsel if he were indigent) at the time he entered his plea?