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The Essential Academics: Addressing And Engaging The Real World

I've written about a species of analysis that I think is best described as "academic Broderism," a description coined by Jon Zasloff and endorsed by Scott Lemeiux. (See also Emily Bazelon.) The most notable practitioners that I have seen of this are Cass Sunstein and Jeffrey Rosen, both contributors to The New Republic and other "serious" publications. I want to provide a counterpoint example and it so happens that perhaps the finest Left law blog there is, Balkinization, gives us two of the best examples - Georgetown Law Professor Marty Lederman and Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin.

Lederman and Balkin consistently provide well reasoned analysis that understands the politics of the Supreme Court and the law, and also engages the real world consequences. On the discussion of the day, the utter predictability of how Chief Justice Roberts and Associate Justice Alito would change the Court, Balkin and Lederman were clear eyed during the nomination process and urgent in their writings, and remain so now. The typical academic detachment was not deemed necessary by these two legal scholars. More.

In the aftermath of this Supreme Court term, Balkin wrote:

Over at Slate, Emily Bazelon points out that moderate legal academics were completely bamboozled by John Robert's understated and lawyerly demeanor. They figured that because he had the right temperament he wouldn't end up that far to the right. As Emily points out, this was just wishful thinking. We've seen the results this term. Roberts and Alito have taken very conservative positions in a number of cases; they have done so by twisting previous precedents rather than directly overruling them. There was, in fact a structural explanation for these results that should have been obvious to anyone at the time. It was certainly obvious to me. . . . What is the moral of this story? Pay more attention to the structural background of judicial nominations, and less attention to whether a nominee sounds like a nice guy. Nobody should have been fooled by the Roberts nomination. If we pay attention to how partisan entrenchment works, we will follow the Who's advice-- we won't get fooled again.

Lederman wrote:

the Chief Justice's contribution should not be underestimated. As Emily Bazelon explains in this terrific post, many self-styled liberals and moderates expressed some optimism a year or two ago that John Roberts would not be a predictable conservative vote -- as Jeff Rosen described it, that Roberts viewed himself as a consensus-builder seeking to find common ground among the Justices (as in the Solomon Amendment decision in his first Term), discouraging splintered opinions and endeavoring to avoid the impression that the Court's decisions are ideologically driven (and divided). For example, as Media Matters reminds us, the Washington Post endorsed Roberts's confirmation, even though its editorial board expected him to cast some votes they would not approve, because he had "a modest conception of the judicial function [and] a strong belief in the stability of precedent," and because "[w]hile [Roberts] almost certainly won't surprise America with generally liberal rulings, he appears almost as unlikely to willfully use the law to advance his conservative politics." But if I'm not mistaken, the Chief Justice voted for the more conservative result (by most observers' lights) in 24 out of the 24 cases decided by a 5-4 vote. One might assume that in this respect, he is simply following in the footsteps of his predecessor. Yet occasionally Chief Justice Rehnquist would vote with the more liberal wing of the Court (particularly where he saw that he could not command a majority for the conservative position, as in Hibbs and Dickerson). There are not yet any such examples from the new Chief Justice. I don't think this should surprise anyone who had followed the Chief's career prior to joining the Court. But here's Cass Sunstein, as quoted by Bazelon: "I'm surprised that Roberts has shown no unpredictability at all; in the big cases, he's been so consistent in his conservatism. I thought that he was too careful a lawyer to be so predictable.

And it would be remiss to not mention the work of Brian Tamanaha:

On an intellectual level, Sunstein’s contrast has plausibility, but on the gut level it seems to mischaracterize the situation.
Notwithstanding these differences, it is both important and true that in every important case this term, the minimalists and the visionaries have agreed about the proper result. Roberts, Alito, Scalia, and Thomas have been operating a bit like the Four Horsemen of the Court's distant past -- not in the sense that their views are poorly reasoned (they aren't) or palpably wrong (they aren't), but in the sense that they vote together with real regularity, and in predictably conservative ways.

The key lesson to be taken from the Supreme Court’s decisions this term is not that conservatives are in control of the court—that was plain already—but that they are willing to aggressively exercise this control to further the conservative agenda.

In their respective confirmation hearings, Justice [“I call balls and strikes”] Roberts and Justice [“A judge’s duty is to follow the law”] Alito promised that their decisions would not be based upon their political views. To many observers that sounded disingenuous or naïve, but it is the correct position to take. It suggested that they would judge with restraint and self-awareness, and it confirmed their recognition that they are a court of law, not the Supreme Political Council. Nonetheless, it did not take long before Justices Roberts and Alito, along with their conservative cohorts, embarked upon their rightward constitutional march, slowly at first, then picking up the pace at the end.

Even Scalia characterized Roberts’ minimalist style as a fraud, writing “This faux judicial restraint is judicial obfuscation.” . . .

Besides that Sunstein’s account is suspect as a descriptive matter, at least with respect to the minimalists, the problem with characterizing their internal division as a difference of legal philosophy is that it lends too much gravitas to the window dressing. To talk of Bentham and Burke in this context seems too grand.

We need intellectual firepower that is honest and clear-eyed on matters like this. The detached and disingenuous "serious" approach of the Sunsteins, Rosens and Lazarus' may play well in Washington legal circles, but like the High Broderism of the Beltway practiced on conventional policy issues, it is what leads to what Grover Norquist crudely calls political "date rape".

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    I've been meaning to ask you (5.00 / 1) (#2)
    by andgarden on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 05:54:23 PM EST
    Do you think there's any relationship between the inability of Democrats to filibuster Alito and their refusal to end the war in the manner you suggest?

    I get the impression that Democrats have a strong sense of how the process of politics is supposed to work, and are unwilling to deviate from that.

    The feeling that "everything will work out if we wait" seems prevalent, and not helpful. (Birds of a feather with "knife to a gunfight," no?)

    A 1 to 1 relationship (5.00 / 2) (#3)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 06:10:38 PM EST
    I also wonder if this isn't the second (none / 0) (#8)
    by Militarytracy on Mon Jul 02, 2007 at 12:24:19 AM EST
    generation of this style of Democratic Party Nonleadership built on the old foundations of Gephardt and Daschle, and very ineffective in dealing with the new style Republican Party built on the foundations of The Newt.

    Parent
    I disagree on 2 points (5.00 / 1) (#5)
    by Sailor on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 08:59:33 PM EST
    1. You said "species of analysis" ...  that should read  'species of analysts.'

    2. The Essential Academics Sorry dude, the essential academics deal with science. Lawyers and so called 'political scientists' deal with opinion. Actual science involves facts.


    Elitist snob (none / 0) (#6)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 09:07:22 PM EST
    You are part of the problem . . .

    <snark>

    Parent

    The real world (none / 0) (#1)
    by Alien Abductee on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 05:50:21 PM EST
    a court of law, not the Supreme Political Council

    But isn't this something of a modern fiction? Tocqueville described the American judicial system as inherently political:

    THE ANGLO-AMERICANS have retained the characteristics of judicial power which are common to other nations--They have, however, made it a powerful political organ

    ...[A]n American judge can pronounce a decision only when litigation has arisen, he is conversant only with special cases, and he cannot act until the cause has been duly brought before the court. His position is therefore exactly the same as that of the magistrates of other nations, and yet he is invested with immense political power. How does this come about? If the sphere of his authority and his means of action are the same as those of other judges, whence does he derive a power which they do not possess? The cause of this difference lies in the simple fact that the Americans have acknowledged the right of judges to found their decisions on the Constitution rather than on the laws. In other words, they have permitted them not to apply such laws as may appear to them to be unconstitutional....

    An American constitution is not supposed to be immutable, as in France; nor is it susceptible of modification by the ordinary powers of society, as in England. It constitutes a detached whole, which, as it represents the will of the whole people, is no less binding on the legislator than on the private citizen, but which may be altered by the will of the people in predetermined cases, according to established rules. In America the Constitution may therefore vary; but as long as it exists, it is the origin of all authority, and the sole vehicle of the predominating force....

    Whenever a law that the judge holds to be unconstitutional is invoked in a tribunal of the United States, he may refuse to admit it as a rule; this power is the only one peculiar to the American magistrate, but it gives rise to immense political influence. In truth, few laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power for any length of time, for there are few that are not prejudicial to some private interest or other, and none that may not be brought before a court of justice by the choice of parties or by the necessity of the case. But as soon as a judge has refused to apply any given law in a case, that law immediately loses a portion of its moral force. Those to whom it is prejudicial learn that means exist of overcoming its authority, and similar suits are multiplied until it becomes powerless. The alternative, then, is, that the people must alter the Constitution or the legislature must repeal the law. The political power which the Americans have entrusted to their courts of justice is therefore immense, but the evils of this power are considerably diminished by the impossibility of attacking the laws except through the courts of justice. If the judge had been empowered to contest the law on the ground of theoretical generalities, if he were able to take the initiative and to censure the legislator, he would play a prominent political part; and as the champion or the antagonist of a party, he would have brought the hostile passions of the nation into the conflict. But when a judge contests a law in an obscure debate on some particular case, the importance of his attack is concealed from public notice; his decision bears upon the interest of an individual, and the law is slighted only incidentally. Moreover, although it is censured, it is not abolished; its moral force may be diminished but its authority is not taken away; and its final destruction can be accomplished only by the reiterated attacks of judicial functionaries. It will be seen, also, that by leaving it to private interest to censure the law, and by intimately uniting the trial of the law with the trial of an individual, legislation is protected from wanton assaults and from the daily aggressions of party spirit.

    And the mitigations to that political power he mentions have been overcome by the concerted efforts of the conservative movement over the past three decades to take over the judiciary.

    I think you'd have to believe there's some absolute realm of reality where The Truth exists, and where the True Meaning of the Constitution lives, to think that even with the best intentions in the world Roberts and Alito were going to do anything other than express their radical conservative political views in their decisions.

    You sound like a Legal Realist (none / 0) (#4)
    by Big Tent Democrat on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 06:11:49 PM EST
    Good for you.

    Parent
    Just a cheerful nihilist (none / 0) (#7)
    by Alien Abductee on Sun Jul 01, 2007 at 09:16:14 PM EST