Devolution of power in the Democratic Party is inextricably tied to Dean's 50 state strategy. I don't know if I agree with Dean's execution of the strategy, in fact I am pretty sure I disagree with a lot of it, but the idea of a 50 state Democratic Party is sound, even essential, to its continued relevance.
It is no secret that I am a proponent of a politics of contrast for Dems. I am also a proponent of a Big Tent Dem Party. Are these two ideas mutually exclusive? I think not.
For example, while I am skeptical of a short term strategy that can deliver significant wins for Dems in the South, the medium and long term offer opportunities. But I think they come from the devolution strategy that Howard Dean is trying to execute, creating strong state Democratic parties that control their own local message. National branding still requires a national message and, more importantly, negative branding of the Republicans.
Last year, Mark Schmitt wrote a compelling piece, "One Democratic Party, Or Many?" that I think nicely illustrates this point:
A few months ago, I heard Ed [Kilgore], in response to a question at a talk, explain how Democrats had, over several decades, crafted several different ways to win in the South, the most recent being a coalition of white suburbanites, African-Americans and rural whites based on improving education, with Governor Hunt of North Carolina an example. His argument was that Democrats would win again, with a different coalition. If Ed's written this up, I hope he'll share the link -- it was more useful than the complete works of Earl and Merle Back.
Beyond the Deep South, Oklahoma, Wyoming, Montana, Kansas, Arizona and Tennessee all have Democratic governors and they all have one thing in common: they are very popular. In addition, the big Midwestern states that were a powerful base for Republicans in the 1990s have now mostly swung back; if Ted Strickland is elected governor of Ohio next fall it will be a significant shift back.
It is tempting to pick any one of those governors -- Schweitzer in Montana, Bredesen in Tennessee, Napolitano in Arizona, etc. -- and say, "that's the formula for Democrats." Obviously, each of them has figured out some sort of formula that works for them in their state. But their formulas are all very different -- Schweitzer populist, Bredesen high-tech, Napolitano tough and clean -- and all of them would face a different situation if they ran for U.S. Senate, where voters' opinion of the national Democratic party comes into play. . . But clearly something about the national Democratic party was pulling these candidates down.
True enough. But Mark picked states where Dems simply aren't going to win in the short term. And no message we deliver will change that. Oklahoma and Alabama? Forget them, in the short term.
And this is where Mark's analysis faltered in my opinion. He looks at states where we have no chance to prove what? Mark thinks a better national message can deliver Oklahoma? Alabama? Puhleeaze. No more than Massachusetts can be delivered to the GOP at the national level. Thus Mark made this error:
[Competence in governing is] very different, though, from the idea that we need a single, coherent national message (economic populism or cultural moderation or national security). But even if there were a strong national message, would all of our state-level stars, the Napolitanos and Granholms, the Easleys and Sebeliuses, embrace it? And if they wouldn't, what's the point?
The point is we can win in PURPLE states. We can find a message that works in purple AND blue. And, to be frank, it is basically a negative message about the extremists that run the GOP.
But that is not to say that multiple local messages are not also necessary. The Big Tent. And Howard Dean understands this. Thus his devolution strategy is essential to making a national Democratic Party, a Big Tent Democratic Party, a relevant and powerful reality. The devil is in the details of course, but the big picture is essential, and I think Dean gets the big picture.
