We find it ironic that the Court relied upon none other than Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) to establish the above proposition:

The one statement in the Congressional Record that refers to an intent
requirement in § 2339B was made by Senator Hatch, who cosponsored AEDPA.

In introducing the Senate Conference Report to the Senate, Senator Hatch stated: “[t]his bill also includes provisions making it a crime to knowingly provide material support to the terrorist functions of foreign groups designated by a Presidential finding to be engaged in terrorist activities. I am convinced we have crafted a narrow but effective designation provision which meets these obligations while safeguarding the freedom to associate, which none of us would willingly give up.” 142 Cong. Rec. S3354 (daily ed. April 16, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (emphasis added).

Bottom line:

Thus, to sustain a conviction under § 2339B, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the donor had knowledge that the organization was designated by the Secretary as a foreign terrorist organization or that
the donor had knowledge of the organization’s unlawful activities that caused it to be so designated.

We know we're running on here a bit, but this part is really important, so stay with us. In a prior appeal of this same case, the 9th Circuit ruled that the terms “personnel” and “training” were "void for vagueness under the First and Fifth Amendments because they bring within their ambit constitutionally protected speech and advocacy."

The Government in today's case argued it had fixed that problem. It said it revised the U.S. Attorney's Manual to define the terms so all is fine now. The 9th Circuit disagreed.

Because “personnel” could be construed to include unequivocally pure speech and advocacy protected by the First Amendment, we decline to depart from our legal ruling in Humanitarian Law Project II that the term “personnel” is void for vagueness.

We also reaffirm our legal conclusion in Humanitarian Law Project II that the
term “training” is unconstitutionally vague. Reasonable people could easily assume that the use of the word “training” in § 2339B encompasses First Amendment protected activities.

....The government argues that it has cured the constitutional deficiencies in §2339B’s prohibition of “personnel” and “training” because it developed the definition of the two terms in the United States Attorneys’ Manual. The government’s argument carries little weight, however, because the proper analysis centers on whether the statute provides citizens with reasonable notice. ...

The Court noted, the U.S. Attorneys' Manual conveys no rights and is not enforceable. Further,

Because the United States Attorneys’ Manual’s expanded definition is neither accessible to the public nor clear from the statute, we conclude that the United States Attorneys’ Manual definitions do not change our holding.

The Court didn't invalidate the whole statute--just the portions criminalizing the provision of personnel and training.

Thus, § 2339B is enforceable, except for the terms “personnel” and “training” included in the definition of “material support.”

We analyzed this AEDPA provision, the earlier 9th Cir. case and the U.S. Attorney's Manual provision last October, here. A detailed background post on the Buffalo Six case is here. Howard Bashman of How Appealing also finds today's ruling to be very significant.