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George Zimmerman: State Files Response on Recusal of Judge

The state has filed its response (available here) in the 5th District Court of Appeals to George Zimmerman's request for a Writ of Prohibition seeking to have Judge Lester removed from the case.

Shorter version: The judge gave Zimmerman a well-deserved tongue lashing, but his fear he won't get a fair trial from the judge is not objectively reasonable, and thus his motion to recuse was not legally sufficient and Lester was right to deny it.

None of the comments by the trial court rise to the level of being legally sufficient to establish an objectively reasonable fear by Petitioner that he will not receive a fair trial by the judge. Instead, the judge was simply giving Petitioner a well deserved tongue lashing for allowing others to mislead the court about his passport and his financial situation.

The test is whether a reasonable person in George Zimmerman's position would fear not getting a fair trial from this judge. [More...]

As I wrote here:

Judge Lester impugned George Zimmerman's character, saying he "flouted the system." He said he exhibited disrespect for the judicial process. He said he was a manipulator. He doesn't think Zimmerman is credible. He has suggested there is probable cause for the state to charge him with a crime for misrepresentations in his bail application. He is holding the threat of contempt over Zimmerman's head. The state presented no evidence other than a flimsy affidavit that failed to include information it had contradicting its theory of guilt, and he found the evidence against Zimmerman "strong." In setting bail at a million dollars, he didn't even acknowledge the strength of the defense evidence presented and admitted at the hearing. He even gratuitously threw in he thought Zimmerman might be preparing to flee.

The question is whether a reasonable person in Zimmerman's situation -- a defendant in his court -- would fear the judge is biased as a result of his comments and rulings.

I also don't think much of the state's argument that this is O'Mara's second motion to recuse a judge based on impartiality. The motion O'Mara filed in April was based on section (d)(2) of the rule (affinity of judge to an interested person) not the impartiality section (d)(1). (The rule is here.) Although O'Mara mentions impartiality in the first motion, he cites a case law for his statement, not the rule, and it seems obvious to me the first motion is filed only under section (d)(2).

The import: If O'Mara's motion to recuse Lester was the first motion filed under Section (d)(1), he has to treat the facts as true. Only if it is considered a second motion under (d)(1) does the judge have discretion to rule on whether the alleged facts are true or not.

The state's response was entirely predictable.

I expect the state will argue that the motion is insufficient on its face, that all Lester did was issue an adverse ruling, he didn't express an opinion as to his views of the overall case, and that a reasonable person in Zimmerman's situation would not fear he couldn't get a fair trial (or SYG hearing.) Or maybe they will try to cast it as a successive motion.

The state says Zimmerman's fear was not objectively reasonable. Put yourself in Zimmerman's shoes: The issue is how he feels, and whether his fear is reasonable. Would you, if you were George Zimmerman, fear not getting a fair trial before Judge Lester? I think any reasonable person would have that fear. We'll see what the 5th Circuit says.

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    The proverbial blind man ... (5.00 / 3) (#1)
    by Robot Porter on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 05:37:00 PM EST
    could see Lester's bias with a cane.

    "well-deserved"? (5.00 / 1) (#3)
    by unitron on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 06:41:24 PM EST
    I'm not so sure about that.

    The whole do it yourself website approach to a legal defense fund is uncharted territory and Zimmerman and the Mrs. are neither lawyers nor CPAs.

    I'd say some confusion about what's permissible for what is understandable.

    And that money wasn't just all they had for lawyerin', it was all they had, period, and all they would have for the forseeable future.

    And the judge's characterization of it as other people's money was incorrect, both morally and legally.

    Once people donated, it wasn't their money anymore, it was, well, it's a little fuzzy just whose it is legally, but it no longer belonged to the donors.

    Not to mention that the whole Shellie Zimmerman perjury thing smells to high heaven of setup.

    evidence? (none / 0) (#7)
    by cpinva on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 07:33:15 PM EST
    Not to mention that the whole Shellie Zimmerman perjury thing smells to high heaven of setup.

    you're suggesting the state told her to go visit her husband in jail, and while there, speak to him in code, regarding the amount of money thus far collected in their web site account? i assume you have concrete evidence to support this otherwise ludicrous assertion? no, you don't?

    further, you're suggesting the state then ordered mrs. zimmerman to pejure herself on the witness stand, while being examined and cross-examined? again, i assume you have tangible evidence to support this claim. none, you say?

    well, color me stunned! not.

    Parent

    They asked her... (5.00 / 2) (#13)
    by unitron on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 11:10:13 PM EST
    ...if she knew how much was in the account.

    It being a dynamic situation, she did not (the figure could have changed between the time the question was asked and her answer a second or so later), but she offered to put them in touch with the guy handling it, who was better placed than anybody else to give an up to date figure.

    They weren't interested, but they made sure to remove that part from the transcript with no indication that it had been removed when they charged her with lying about it.

    Are you confusing jail visits with telephone conversations?

    Conversations which they knew the government was taping, but which could possibly be overheard by guards (who may or may not be completely honest and trustworthy) and other prisoners, a situation in which it would be insane to talk about large sums of money when it could lead to people on the outside harming her or other members of his family in an attempt to steal it.

    Parent

    They weren't interested (none / 0) (#23)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 07:57:07 AM EST
    They weren't interested, but they made sure to remove that part from the transcript with no indication that it had been removed when they charged her with lying about it.

    Since they would have been perfectly satisfied, if she simply told them how much there was, when she last checked the paypal account and transferred money.

    At least had I been her, I would have assumed so as a complete legal layman, which I do not think GZ can be considered.

    I am still pondering the gender issues involved that GZ did not simply give Shellie all the details before he surrendered to police.

    Parent

    I somehow agree (none / 0) (#24)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 08:00:47 AM EST
    And the judge's characterization of it as other people's money was incorrect, both morally and legally.

    Although, again had it been me, I would assume that I received the money under specific conditions. And strictly, I would have considered the bond as trial related expenses, as Shellie indeed did: "That's what it is there for."

    Parent

    I expect (5.00 / 1) (#5)
    by CoralGables on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 06:58:21 PM EST
    Zimmerman to lose this one.

    In order for that to happen.... (none / 0) (#14)
    by Jello333 on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 11:50:06 PM EST
    .... the appeals court will have to find that it is NOT reasonable for George to fear that he can't get a fair trial from Lester. You seriously believe they'll say that? Put yourself in George's shoes.... would YOU trust Lester? Would ANY reasonable person under those circumstances?

    Parent
    Three part question (none / 0) (#17)
    by CoralGables on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 12:35:55 AM EST
    1. Yes
    2. No, but that's paranoia not reasonable.
    3. A reasonable person wouldn't be in his position.


    Parent
    4 Second recusal motion. (none / 0) (#18)
    by oculus on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 12:49:56 AM EST
    Should I have just said (none / 0) (#19)
    by CoralGables on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 01:08:23 AM EST
    asked and answered?

    Parent
    When in doubt, just say "asked and (none / 0) (#20)
    by oculus on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 01:51:36 AM EST
    answered!"  

    Parent
    Denied (5.00 / 0) (#9)
    by boar d laze on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 09:52:38 PM EST
    The Petition did not make a good case.  

    The court had to make findings for its reconsideration order, and did nothing more than describe what Mr. Zimmerman actually did.  Reminding Mr. Zimmerman that there may be further  consequences of violating the bail application was simply a restatement of the bail statute, not a sign of bias.  

    It was something of a relief to see that the State used someone with actual appellate experience to write the Response, I don't think I could have taken much more of de la Rionda's prose.  

    That the Response did little more than make the obvious arguments (per Jeralyn) against disqualification does not make it less convincing or dispositve.  The Motion and Petition were little more than whining -- and odd whining at that, in that the defendant is out on bail.

    Misleading? (none / 0) (#15)
    by MJW on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 11:56:39 PM EST
    Unless the writ has already been denied by the DCA, your title is very misleading.

    Parent
    was it changed? (none / 0) (#25)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 08:05:34 AM EST
    Was it changed meanwhile, MJW? Otherwise, I do not understand.

    Parent
    Sorry for the Confusion (none / 0) (#30)
    by boar d laze on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 10:33:05 AM EST
    Too late to change the heading.  

    Parent
    with me confusing even further (none / 0) (#40)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 04:43:34 PM EST
    I thought he meant Jeralyn's headline.

    No need to say sorry, it was me confusing matters.

    Lets call it a prognosis. To the layman it feels it is a very convincing argument.

    While O'Mara's writ of prohibition contained questionable arguments it feels, e.g. how should the defense have correctly described TM if not  "unarmed" and "a juvenile" according to the defendant and his lawyer? Who will consider this prejudicial but the faithful.


    Parent

    A fair ruling (none / 0) (#2)
    by Lacy on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 06:37:45 PM EST
    The ruling gives excellent examples of why the defendant has no basis under the law to replace the Judge. Zimmerman's arguments come down to the fear that the judge has come to realize from Zimmerman's own actions before him that Zimmerman is a devious character. That does not establish prejudice or bias, and does not come close to being the valid basis for recusal.

    That should obvious to any objective person who reads the opinion.

    really...... (none / 0) (#4)
    by lily on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 06:44:25 PM EST
    witness 11 statement link

    Parent
    really. (none / 0) (#6)
    by cpinva on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 07:27:56 PM EST
    unfortunately, witness 11 is pretty useless, and here's why: she saw nothing, not even mr. zimmerman after the confrontation was over. she heard, but didn't recognize, both voices. the only thing she actually saw that night was a photo, purportedly taken just a few moments before, of mr. zimmerman. she saw nothing, because, as she states up front, it was too dark to see anything, from where she was.

    i'm not clear on exactly what you think this proves, relative to the issue at hand (which is the decision, regarding mr. zimmerman's request to have the current judge removed from his case), but it simply proves nothing of substance.

    Parent

    witness 11 is very important (none / 0) (#11)
    by Jeralyn on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 10:34:28 PM EST
    As I wrote here, I think the most important witnesses are are W-11 and W-20, W-13, and W-6. Read my older posts on W-11, this thread is about the motion to disqualify.

    Have you listened to her interviews or read the reports of them?

    Parent

    Lacy, please state your opinions as such (none / 0) (#12)
    by Jeralyn on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 10:39:11 PM EST
    they are certainly not fact or an undisputed interpretation of the law.

    Parent
    Fair enough (none / 0) (#21)
    by Lacy on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 06:54:02 AM EST
    I agree that it is only my opinion that stating a law or basis for recusal as "..whether a reasonable person in George Zimmerman's position would fear not getting a fair trial from this judge",  is not sufficient to convey the fact that actual interpretations of that law dictate the ruling, not what a layman (or some lawyers) think or wish the words conveyed.

    Those interpretations are necessary to define "resonable" fear, since unwary readers will apply inappropriate and subjective angles to "reasonable", which comments show has happened here.

    Google "Sirica rule recusal" and, interestingly, my own post here 4 years ago comes up first as a critique of the WV Supreme court Justice who, on the other side of the coin, weaseled his way out of recusal. (I also wrote an Op-Ed in the Charleston Gazette on the subject.)

     

    Parent

    reasonable fear - objective fear (none / 0) (#22)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 07:47:34 AM EST
    Those interpretations are necessary to define "resonable" fear, since unwary readers will apply inappropriate and subjective angles to "reasonable", which comments show has happened here.

    This is absolutely my impression, Lacy, and I am in fact struggling with it for quite some time now.

    In which US laws would I find a legal definition of reasonable, or especially "reasonable fear"? Besides the ruling, if that is the correct term, additionally seems to make a distinction between reasonable and objective. I had the impression, which obviously can be completely wrong, that "objective" is more law based and does not solely depend on the defendants feelings. Which leads me to assume it is always based on other cases, or legal decisions and there may not be a legal definition. Completely wrong?


    Parent

    Reasonable (none / 0) (#34)
    by boar d laze on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 02:02:54 PM EST
    Reasonable is a metaphor for objective.  In law, the concept of "reasonable" posits a "reasonable person."  The question is not what the person at issue would do or feel in a given circumstance, but what would a hypothetical reasonable (and objective) person in the same circumstance do or feel.  

    Parent
    The word "reasonable" here is misleading (none / 0) (#44)
    by Lacy on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 08:09:21 PM EST
    I don't think the determining factor is actually what a reasonable person would think (i.e.fearing bias by the judge).  It's whether that fear of bias is supported and justified. And the citations make it clear that the judge can form opinions of the accused's guilt from the behavior of the defendant and courtroom events, and vocalize some rather pointed comments about the accused without establishing a basis for recusal.

     

    Parent

    The response was written Attorney General (none / 0) (#8)
    by Nettles18 on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 08:38:52 PM EST
    Pam Bondi wrote this and not the State Prosecutor.  Is that normal?

    she didn't write it (none / 0) (#10)
    by Jeralyn on Fri Aug 24, 2012 at 10:25:51 PM EST
    Pamela Kollar, a lawyer in her office did.

    If you are asking whether the AG's office can file the brief, it says it is being submitted by the counsel for the Respondent, the State of Florida, which the AG does represent.

    I don't think it's out of the ordinary. Here is another from 2010 that the AG's office filed. And another.

    Parent

    Pam Koller reminds us in her response (none / 0) (#28)
    by Nettles18 on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 09:59:08 AM EST
    that the Judge allowed Mr. Zimmerman to live out of State for safety reasons after the first bond hearing.  She doesn't advise the appeals court that in the 2nd order the Judge insisted that Mr. Zimmerman live in the county where the incident occurred.  How does misleading the court about finances negate safety issues?  That move alone should cause the Judge to have to recuse. IMO

    Parent
    Appellate Work is Best Done by Appellate Lawyers (none / 0) (#29)
    by boar d laze on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 10:32:11 AM EST
    Appellate work is fairly specialized -- not that it fits the definition of a "legal specialty" -- and is best done by people who know how to make the sort of presentation appellate justices find comfortable.  

    Most country district attorney's offices (in Florida that would be the State Attorney for a given area) do not have appellate divisions.  So, yes.  It is common practice to have the appellate division in the AG's office take care of the appellate work.  

    If you've read Mr. de la Rionda's written submissions, surely you must agree that it would be cruel and unusual punishment to have had him prepare the Response. Not just for him, but for anyone who read it.  

    And yes. I called you Shirley.  

    Parent

    but for anyone who read it. (none / 0) (#32)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 11:50:31 AM EST
    I like this type of humor, thus could you help me with a link considering his "written submission" although, yes, I could do some research, or search my external drive on matters, problem is what it is exactly I need to search. In other words I am not sure what I am looking for.

    Parent
    Motions and Oppositions (none / 0) (#36)
    by boar d laze on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 02:22:20 PM EST
    The prosecution has made and opposed several motions at the trial court level which are signed  (and presumably written) by Mr. de la Rionda.  

    They are on the 18th Circuit Court website at:  http://www.flcourts18.org/presspublic.html  Don't forget to bookmark the site.  

    As you can see, BDLR's law and motion work bears the hallmarks of trial attorney writing:  Too much spin, conclusory reasoning, swipes at the opposition, quotes too long, etc.  

    When I practiced, I found that it helped to make written submissions which read as though they had been written by an appellate court.  

    Of course, motions, writs and appears are usually you won or lost on the law/facts, and not the quality of the representation.  But if it's a very close call it's helpful to hit the judge's (or justices') comfort level.  
     

    Parent

    thanks (none / 0) (#41)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 04:47:54 PM EST
    that was helpful, since admittedly I did not pay much attention who signed the prosecution's documents.

    But you are correct, already the first I took another look at starts with absolutely irrelevant matter, that I wondered about when I read it the first time. Verbose, not to the point?

    Parent

    Irre.evant? (none / 0) (#80)
    by boar d laze on Wed Aug 29, 2012 at 09:03:44 AM EST
    I don't know what you've been reading but the Response begins with a Procedural and Factual recap which is (a) necessary, and (b) anything but irrelevant.

    If you're talking about the "Merits" section, discussing the basics of this type of motion is also standard.  There's nothing wrong with how the Response is written.  

    It's competent, well researched, and not overly "spun."  

    Parent

    Misrepresentaion in response (none / 0) (#16)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 12:23:03 AM EST
    (This is a retread version of my forum comment.)

    Page 20:

    Petitioner also asserts that the court continues to "hold over" Petitioner the possibility of contempt proceedings. (Pet. Appex. Pages 12-13). However, examination of the court's order indicates that Petitioner has taken this reference out of context; the court's reference to its declination to exercise contempt powers comes directly after a discussion of the Third District Court of Appeal's opinion in State Washington, 37 Fla. L. Weekly D1535 (Fla. 3d DCA June 27, 2012), wherein the list of potential remedies of bond conditions, which include "the arrest and commitment of a defendant. . . harsher conditions of pretrial release. . . increase the amount of bond. . . pretrial detention. . . [or] direct or indirect criminal contempt." Id. (Pet. Appendix Page 350). Immediately after quoting this language from Washington, the trial court discussed each alternative including, but not limited to, the possibility of contempt proceedings. Id. The socalled "threat," if there was one, was contained in the language taken verbatim from Washington.

    That's not really so. On page 5, after quoting from Paul, not Washington, Judge Lester says:

    This Court has, thus far, declined to exercise its contempt powers and the State failed to prove that the Defendant may be held without bond. Further action by this Court, therefore, is limited to his already-effected arrest, the subsequent release on new bond conditions and the possibility of future contempt proceedings.

    (My emphasis) None of the quoted language from Judge Lester is taken verbatim from Paul, and the emphasized phrases certainly don't seem to me to suggest the court is declining to exercise its contempt powers; more like it may not have gotten around to it yet.

    MJW (none / 0) (#26)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 08:40:30 AM EST
    When I read the passage you cite, I had the impression it was a warning, with the "possibility of future contempt proceedings" a more open phrase that could even allude to possible further evidence. I think the context, that he decides to differ from the prosecutions position is important: the State failed to prove...

    After I looked at the legal definitions available on the web, he may well be alluding to the fact that he can immediately rule in such cases, but obviously decides to not do so. Although, I may be misinterpreting this.

    This Wikipedia quote puzzles me, admittedly, unfortunately it gives no source:

    The burden of proof for civil contempt, however, is a preponderance of the evidence, and theoretically punitive sanctions (punishment) can only be imposed after due process but the due process is unpublished.

    Hints to information on the net as far as further readings are concerned would be appreciated.

    Parent

    don't worry about the wikipedia quote (none / 0) (#27)
    by LeaNder on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 08:41:54 AM EST
    Now, I understand.

    Parent
    Civil versus criminal contempt (none / 0) (#42)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 06:39:11 PM EST
    This Wikipedia quote puzzles me, admittedly, unfortunately it gives no source:
     
    The burden of proof for civil contempt, however, is a preponderance of the evidence, and theoretically punitive sanctions (punishment) can only be imposed after due process but the due process is unpublished.

    I realize you said not to worry about this quote, but I thought it might be worthwhile to point out the the contempt proceedings the judge contemplates against Zimmerman would be for criminal contempt, where the burden of proof is beyond a reasonable doubt. Civil contempt can only be used to force compliance with a judicial order, and it must be within the subject's power to comply. It can't be used to punish past misbehavior.

    Parent

    Compensatory fines (none / 0) (#43)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 07:06:43 PM EST
    I forgot to mention that civil contempt can also be used to fine someone who disobeys a court in order to compensate a party injured by the disobedience.

    Parent
    MJW (none / 0) (#45)
    by LeaNder on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 06:16:55 AM EST
    that's what I meant when I wrote, now I understand. I realized that the knot in my head was produced by mixing up civil and criminal contempt, and the different ways they are dealt with.

    I shouldn't have, since the first source I used makes the difference pretty clear. And I am sure Wikipedia does too.

    But there you go. Small mind, big subject, no established synapses to handle it.

    Thanks anyway.

    Parent

    JIC (none / 0) (#31)
    by boar d laze on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 10:43:53 AM EST
    Just in case it needs further explanation; the order contained a menu of three possible alternatives from which the judge could choose, including denial, resetting bail and a future contempt hearing.  

    When the court chose to reset the bail amount, the other choices were no longer available.  

    However... that doesn't necessarily mean that's an end to the matter because the State still has an option to prosecute.  

    Sec 903.035(3) provides: Any person who intentionally provides false or misleading material information or intentionally omits material information in connection with an application for bail or for modification of bail is guilty of a misdemeanor or felony which is one degree less than that of the crime charged for which bail is sought, but which in no event is greater than a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083.

    Parent

    Not "pick one of three" (none / 0) (#33)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 12:48:04 PM EST
    When the court chose to reset the bail amount, the other choices were no longer available.

    That's just not true. The court says:

    Further action by this Court, therefore, is limited to his already-effected arrest, the subsequent release on new bond conditions and the possibility of future contempt proceedings.

    The first two have happened: Zimmerman was rearrested and the bond conditions were changed. The final is held over Zimmerman's head as a future possibility. Sort of, two down, one to go. Resetting the bond does not logically or legally prevent a contempt charge.

    It is true that double-jeopardy makes criminal contempt and 903.035 mutually exclusive. But that's all the more reason to see the judge's comment as a threat. Lester is cheer leading for the state to charge Zimmerman with violating 903.035. So he may be holding up the contempt charge, which carries a maximum 6 month sentence, hoping Zimmerman will be charged with a felony instead.

    Parent

    No. (none / 0) (#35)
    by boar d laze on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 02:12:22 PM EST
    There was no subsequent arrest following the reconsideration of bail. The arrest came after the court received notice from the defendant's representative that the defendant misrepresented his financial situation during the Arthur hearing.  

    The court ordered an arrest on that basis immediately after receiving notice.  

    The defense subsequently moved for reconsideration of bail, and the court acted by reconsidering the bail request, resetting the bail so that Mr. Zimmerman would be released when bail when it was posted.  

    Mr. Zimmerman was not and has not been arrested subsequent to that release.  

    My understanding is that the court has manifested its intention not to act further in the matter by not acting further.  

    Note that the trial court also noted that Mrs. Zimmerman with contempt but declined to act, instead the State did.  Further note, that the State may still prosecute Mr. Zimmerman for his "manipulative" conduct during the Arthur bearing.

    Parent

    You'd have a good point if I said that (none / 0) (#38)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 02:50:22 PM EST
    I never said anything to suggest there was a subsequent arrest following the reconsideration of bail.

    The court said:

    Further action by this Court, therefore, is limited to his already-effected arrest, the subsequent release on new bond conditions and the possibility of future contempt proceedings.

    Echoing the court, I said:

    The first two have happened: Zimmerman was rearrested and the bond conditions were changed. The final is held over Zimmerman's head as a future possibility.

    Zimmerman was rearrested, and the bond conditions were changed, in that order. Just as the judge said; just as I said.

    Parent

    Your understanding -- the judge's words (none / 0) (#39)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 02:58:03 PM EST
    My understanding is that the court has manifested its intention not to act further in the matter by not acting further.

    This Court has, thus far, declined to exercise its contempt powers and the State failed to prove that the Defendant may be held without bond. Further action by this Court, therefore, is limited to his already-effected arrest, the subsequent release on new bond conditions and the possibility of future contempt proceedings.

    What does "thus far" mean to you? What does "the possibility of future contempt proceedings" mean to you? How is it possible to see two phrases that explicitly hold out the possibility of future contempt proceedings, despite not acting immediately, as indicating of an intent not to act further?

    Parent

    question (none / 0) (#47)
    by LeaNder on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 12:06:27 PM EST
     
    What does "thus far" mean to you? What does "the possibility of future contempt proceedings" mean to you? How is it possible to see two phrases that explicitly hold out the possibility of future contempt proceedings, despite not acting immediately, as indicating of an intent not to act further?

    Would judge Lester be able to start "furture contempt proceedings" or would this up to prosecution?

    I know, I shouldn't interfere as a legal nitwit, but what is the rule?

    Parent

    Contempt proceedings (none / 0) (#48)
    by MJW on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 12:50:33 PM EST
    Criminal contempt is a weird animal. Even though it's a criminal proceeding, the court can initiate it on its own.

    There are two types of contempt: direct and indirect. Direct contempt is for actions that occur in front of the judge; for example, if during a trial, a lawyer throws his shoe at another lawyer. It can be punished immediately, with little formal procedure. Indirect contempt is for actions that occur outside the judge's presence; for example, a lawyer calls a juror at home. Indirect contempt is basically tried like a regular case, but almost always in front of the judge, not a jury.

    While it may seem any potential contempt charges against Zimmerman would be direct, since he sat like a potted palm in front of the judge, that's actually unlikely. In re Oliver that US supreme court limited the use of direct contempt to to situations that must be dealt with swiftly, because they disrupt the court. Also, for something to be direct contempt, the judge must essentially be able to decide the case on his own knowledge, without receiving outside evidence.

    (Any corrections are welcome.)

    Parent

    direct - indirect (none / 0) (#49)
    by LeaNder on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 03:29:17 PM EST
    While it may seem any potential contempt charges against Zimmerman would be direct, since he sat like a potted palm in front of the judge, that's actually unlikely.

    I think it depends on what part of the activities you consider dominant. It feels the most important part is the semi-collusive behavior (semi, since they knew the calls were recorded) of George and his wife on the jail phone. From Lester's perspective they were indirect, since he wasn't aware of them at the time. Thus he obviously couldn't deal with it directly.  Sitting like a potted plant, or Shellie stating she does not know of other means, is simply a continuation of these arrangements. In this defintion indirect feels much closer.

    A direct contempt is an act that occurs in the presence of the court and is intended to embarrass or engender disrespect for the court. Shouting in the courtroom or refusing to answer questions for a judge or attorney under oath is a direct contempt. Indirect contempt occurs outside the presence of the court, but its intention is also to belittle, mock, obstruct, interrupt, or degrade the court and its proceedings. Attempting to bribe a district attorney is an example of an indirect contempt. Publishing any material that results in a contempt charge is an indirect contempt. Other kinds of indirect contempt include preventing process service, improperly communicating to or by jurors, and withholding evidence. One man was threatened with contempt charges because he had filed more than 350 lawsuits that the judge considered frivolous. Indirect contempt also may be called constructive or consequential contempt; all three terms mean the same thing.

    How much did these activities cost the state, if we leave aside the argument of the GZ camp for a while, Lester could have simply raised the bond. Lester's problem in this context would have been that in this case he also would have tacitly accepted a contempt of court. No?

    Parent

    Direct versus indirect (none / 0) (#50)
    by MJW on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 05:28:32 PM EST
    The distinction between direct and indirect contempt is a bit confusing. It seems to me the Florida courts, themselves, are not always completely consistent.

    Whether or not sitting like a potted plant constitutes contemptuous behavior in the judge's presence, the fact that it happened long ago seems to make it at most indirect contempt. In Walker v. State, the 4th DCA held that perjury committed in the judge's presence could not be treated as direct contempt when it occurred in a prior hearing.

    I somewhat doubt the judge could make a contempt charge stick. The case that George Zimmerman committed contempt for perjury-by-proxy seems weaker than the case that someone (say, Shellie) committed contempt by committing perjury. In several cases, including Emanuel v. State, Florida courts have held that a judge can only hold a witness in contempt for perjury when the judge has judicial knowledge that the testimony was false.

    Parent

    criminal contempt (none / 0) (#52)
    by LeaNder on Mon Aug 27, 2012 at 05:01:41 AM EST
    I found a really valuable source for my specific interest. No idea if it works to link it, the link in any case should lead to the entry in the Oxford companion to American law. No, doesn't link exactly, you have to move one page back. I'll take a look at the articles it lists. Interesting issue.

    In any case, I guess, as I am assuming Lester realizes, the fact that TM reported it to his lawyer himself speaks for him in any argument. ...

    Parent

    Facts is facts (none / 0) (#37)
    by MJW on Sat Aug 25, 2012 at 02:36:14 PM EST
    How much difference would it make if the court didn't treat the asserted facts as true? Most of the asserted facts are part of the court record. What facts disputable?

    Assertions as Facts (none / 0) (#46)
    by boar d laze on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 09:26:57 AM EST
    The admonition to treat all "asserted facts as true" is a legal term of art (aka "jargon," aka "mumbo-jumbo") indicating a standard of review the reviewing court must adopt in review.  It is an admonition that the reviewing court must confine itself to whether a case or cause is raised, and not venture into fact finding.  

    It's also boiler plate, and you'll see it in every moving paper or opposition when it's procedurally applicable -- or at least, you should.


    Parent

    Terms of art (none / 0) (#51)
    by MJW on Sun Aug 26, 2012 at 05:36:31 PM EST
    Term of art though it may be, it still means the state can't argue the facts in O'Mara's motions are wrong. I'm just wondering, if they were allowed, what facts they could dispute.

    Parent
    Probably None (none / 0) (#54)
    by boar d laze on Mon Aug 27, 2012 at 10:17:02 AM EST
    As you noted, the "facts" alleged in the Motion and Petition case were largely (or maybe entirely) verbal and already part of the record.  

    Given the situation, the kind of issue spotting it would take to dig up controvertible facts would take actually paying attention.  

    And since it's moot...  

    Even though it doesn't matter practically, the trial court threw Mr. Zimmerman something of a procedural bone by deeming the Mo to DQ as a first Mo to DQ, and giving him the benefit of the "as true," standard.  

    The defense, as movant/petitioner, would gain nothing by allowing factual allegations to be put in issue.  

    Parent

    Reasonableness and reasonable persons (none / 0) (#55)
    by MJW on Mon Aug 27, 2012 at 03:04:44 PM EST
    I think, Jeralyn, that you are equating "reasonable fear" with the `subjective fear of a reasonable person'. I am afraid you do not properly understand the science of the law on this issue (pls. delete my post if you don't like it). "Reasonable fear" is `justified fear'.

    You and Lacy both say that the proper test for disqualification isn't what a reasonable person would fear. That's not how the Florida supreme court sees it. In Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083 (Fla. 1983), the court said:

    What is important is the party's reasonable belief concerning his or her ability to obtain a fair trial. A determination must be made as to whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.


    Is there a Distinction? (none / 0) (#56)
    by boar d laze on Mon Aug 27, 2012 at 08:14:10 PM EST
    While I wouldn't use the term "justified" myself, I have to ask if there's there any disagreement between the Livingston standard and the statement, "reasonable fear is justified fear?"  

    Perhaps you could elaborate.  

    Also, we've been discussing the motion on Jeralyn's terms by looking at "bias" as something which was shown from remarks made by Judge Lester as part of judicial proceedings; and not stemming from extra-judicially developed prejudice or bias.    

    In my opinion, the prosecution's reliance on Nassetta v. Kaplan, 557 So. 2d 919 is well taken.  See also  Wiley v. Wainwright, 793 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1986); Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685(Fla. 1995); and the cases cited by Barwick.  

    Parent

    Elaboration (none / 0) (#57)
    by MJW on Mon Aug 27, 2012 at 10:51:46 PM EST
    While I wouldn't use the term "justified" myself, I have to ask if there's there any disagreement between the Livingston standard and the statement, "reasonable fear is justified fear?"

    First, let me mention that this is somewhat unrelated to the point of my previous comment, which was that despite Intel's know-it-all tone, Intel doesn't know what he or she is talking about.

    To answer your question with a question, what do you mean by "justified fear"? I would think that the fear the judge is biased is really only justified if the judge is actually biased. That's a fine standard, save for the fact that the court of appeals would have to look into the judge's heart. Absent that, the only reasonable meaning I can see is that the facts would lead a reasonable person to conclude the judge harbored a bias. In which case, the standard seems to be the same.

    In my opinion, the prosecution's reliance on Nassetta v. Kaplan, 557 So. 2d 919 is well taken.  See also  Wiley v. Wainwright, 793 F.2d 1190 (11th Cir. 1986); Barwick v. State, 660 So. 2d 685(Fla. 1995); and the cases cited by Barwick.  

    In Nassetta v. Kaplan, the judge said off the record he didn't care whether the defendant got out of jail or not. Apparently, the remark was less harsh when seen in the actual context. Even without context, the judge was not commenting disparagingly on the defendant's character, or suggesting he was manipulation the legal system. Nor was the judge not only suggesting the defendant might flee, but that he had planned to flee.

    Furthermore, in Nassetta, the judge's comment were made verbally, off the record. The state's response said Judge Lester gave Zimmerman "a well-deserved tongue lashing." That's false. He gave him a "pen lashing." His intemperate remarks were not some off-the-cuff verbal excess, they were part of the written court record.

    Wiley v. Wainwright is a federal court review of a state case, and the court applied the federal standards for disqualification, which generally require that the bias stem from extrajudicial sources. The standard is different in Florida. There are a number Florida case where the judge was disqualified for reasons that wouldn't result in disqualification in federal courts. For example, DeMetro v. Barad, 576 So. 2d 1353 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1991), which held: "Under Florida law, a judge's statement that he feels a party has lied in a case before him, generally indicates bias against the party."

    Barwick v. State is so fact-specific that I don't see a meaningful parallel.

    Parent

    Justified fear (none / 0) (#58)
    by MJW on Mon Aug 27, 2012 at 11:45:17 PM EST
    I could only find one Florida case on judicial disqualification that used the term "justified fear." In Wargo v. Wargo, 669 So. 2d 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), "justified fear" is equated with "a well-grounded fear." In other words, fear based on the facts, presumably as evaluated by a "reasonable person."

    Parent
    Not so much what YOU mean (none / 0) (#59)
    by MJW on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 01:44:53 AM EST
    To answer your question with a question, what do you mean by "justified fear"?

    Sorry about challenging your use of the term "justified fear" when it was right there in Intel's comment. For some reason, when I replied, I'd forgotten that Intel used it. Your comment certainly makes a lot more sense now that I know that. Don't know what I was thinking.

    Parent

    Extra-judicial bais (none / 0) (#60)
    by MJW on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 04:08:23 AM EST
    Also, we've been discussing the motion on Jeralyn's terms by looking at "bias" as something which was shown from remarks made by Judge Lester as part of judicial proceedings; and not stemming from extra-judicially developed prejudice or bias.

    As I mentioned before, the extra-judicial requirement is part of federal law, not Florida law. If you do a Google Scholar search of federal court cases using the term "extrajudicial bias" (in quotes), you'll get pages and pages of disqualification cases. If you do the same with Florida cases, you'll get none.

    If you dispute that, I hope you will provide some Florida case law to support your position. The only case I could find that even vaguely suggests such a requirement is Torres v. State, 697 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), where the court noted that requirement in a federal case, but where the the actual issue was the distinction between personal and judicial bias. Notably, the court disqualified the judge.

    Parent

    the "extra-judicial" requirement (none / 0) (#64)
    by LeaNder on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 05:54:47 AM EST
    The Livington v. State case you cite above, is an interesting one, and it is a Florida case too.

    But isn't it also a case in which the context suggests extrajuridical bias? Or in other words the attorney initially tried to get rid of a specific judge in all his future cases based on a personal rivalry or antagonism between attorney and judge, which wasn't granted. But due to this "personal" (extrajuridical"?) bias that wasn't in any way connected to the case at hand, the attorney felt his client would not get a fair treatment. And this time it was granted.  Admittedly I haven't taken a closer look, but weren't there two witnesses that supported the attorney's claim he would never get a just decision from this judge.

    I have a huge problem with reasonable fear being defined as personal fear only, and I can't believe that "reasonable fear" can be based only on the personal fears of a defendant only, no matter what he does. If it did, every defendant could claim "reasonable fear" based on the simple fact he is prosecuted.

    When he informed the court about the money GZ had collected, O'Mara admitted his client had done something wrong. I have to read the available arguments of all the sides involved much more closely than I admittedly have. But does the defense argument project the "reasonable" fear-- that no doubt could (should) to an extend result from the defendant's own activities in jail--in the form of bias to the judge; because Lester does not accept his attempts to hide the money as an irrelevant mistake of a "confused young man", who at least should have considered or feared the consequences of his own activities? Too much Adderall? Too much buzz about an unexpected money shower?

    It seems the money does not flow into the fund to the extend it did, or does it anyway? Partly at least this could reflect people's reactions to the unimportant incidence. Some may realize they have credit card debts to pay too.

    Parent

    Yes, but... (none / 0) (#74)
    by MJW on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 12:37:25 PM EST
    But isn't it also a case in which the context suggests extrajuridical bias?

    Certainly the decision to disqualify the judge in Livingston is based on extra-juridical bias. But I no one ever claimed that isn't a valid bases for disqualifying a judge. The question is whether a judge can be disqualified for bias that isn't extra-juridical. The answer is: generally not, in the federal courts; yes, in Florida courts.

    Parent

    Writ of prohibition (none / 0) (#66)
    by dolphinocean on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 10:35:53 AM EST
    Anyone here know of the Florida 5th district court of appeal's response to Zimmerman's petition for writ of prohibition to recuse Judge Lester?

    I don't see it reported in the news media. Here's the link:

    http://media.trb.com/media/acrobat/2012-08/120756960-24130516.pdf

    Confused (none / 0) (#67)
    by boar d laze on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 11:10:14 AM EST
    I don't understand what you're asking.  

    If you're asking whether the trial court will file a Response, the answer is "no."  Judge Lester was not required to file a Response, could have if he'd elected to do so, but declined the option by not filing.  The Court of Appeals may not interpret his non-election has significant.

    If you're asking whether the Court has ruled on or otherwise responded to the Petition and Response, the answer is still "no."  

    The Court has yet to rule on the Petition.  Given that it seems to be working on an expedited schedule for this matter, I'd be surprised if the decision doesn't come down by (or before) the end of next week.  

    The link you pasted to the bottom of your post goes to the prosecution's (aka "respondant's") Response to the Petition.  It's not "from," but "to" the Court of Appeals.  I don't understand its relationship to your post.  

    I hope this answers whatever it was you were asking.  

    Parent

    I don't understand what you're asking. (none / 0) (#71)
    by LeaNder on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 11:56:55 AM EST
    boar d laze, he asked, if we already knew the State's response to the Zimmerman/O'Mara Writ of Prohibition. Which admittedly is a peculiar question considering the blog. I noticed since I just finished reading both sides.

    I know, it must be annoying if us legal nitwits crawl this comment section.

    I promise I will shut up again too, just notice the guillotine came down on me.

    Parent

    rereading (none / 0) (#72)
    by LeaNder on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 11:58:39 AM EST
    I noticed since I was just rereading ...

    as I noticed the guillotine preventing me from chatting with intel

    Parent

    Don't Stop (none / 0) (#76)
    by boar d laze on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 05:35:10 PM EST
    If I can ever answer a procedural question I will, and will answer it without spin.  Don't take my confusion as a sign there's something wrong with the question itself.  Sometimes the questions are ambiguous, and sometimes it's just me.  

    I read the question as whether the (5th Dist) Court (of Appeals) itself had responded with a ruling.  Jeralyn read it the same way, so at least I'm not alone.  

    By the way, when an appellate attorney refers to the "Court" with a capital "C," (s)he's talking about the reviewing court.  The trial court and lower appellate courts are referred to as "courts" with a lower case "c."  Knowing that can sometimes cure confusion, and sometimes create it.

    I'm retired, but welcome to my hell anyway.  

    Parent

    court - Court (none / 0) (#77)
    by LeaNder on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 09:38:11 PM EST
    Knowing that can sometimes cure confusion, and sometimes create it.

    You find this in appellate court files too? I am not sure what kind of confusion it could create? Although I can see a tongue-in-cheek (British?) advantage? Like dear "highly" esteemed "Court", but also if you need lower courts and higher Court in the same document.

    I read the question as whether the (5th Dist) Court (of Appeals) itself had responded with a ruling.

    Well, yes, one could read it that way. But why then link to the state's response. I may be completely wrong, but whenever someone blames the media for suppressing or not reporting something, s/he triggers a chain-reaction in my brain, I can't help:

    Anyone here know of the Florida 5th district court of appeal's response ...?

    I don't see it reported in the news media. Here's the link:

    Why link to the same source Jeralyn used for her pdf in the state's response above?

    I have the advantage to have some experts around that help me to better understand matters. But it feels dolphinocean thought this already was the last word already and wondered why media remains so silent about it. Off he is to create waves of excitement all over the web. ;)

    Parent

    Well... (none / 0) (#81)
    by boar d laze on Wed Aug 29, 2012 at 02:40:04 PM EST
    I was an appellate attorney, and the "confusing" reference was supposed to be self-deprecating humor.  

    The "media" do a lousy job on ordinary trials; and are not nearly equipped to handle the levels of complexity and reasoning at the appellate level.  

    There's a lot of kabuki, and you have to know it well enough to separate the mundane from the phenomenal.  Anything the media get right is as likely by accident as not.    

    Parent

    words (none / 0) (#84)
    by LeaNder on Thu Aug 30, 2012 at 04:58:41 AM EST
    I was an appellate attorney

    Attorney is a word that is really difficult for me to grasp, if there is no context to help me further. As you may know over here in Germany the eduction for a judge is slightly different from a lawyer/attorney. A judge has to complete an additional training from the average lawyer ending with a state exam. Other professions have this state exam too, e.g. a teacher first takes the exam at the university and then takes the second exam with the state. They are then called Volljuristen, voll= full, complete, jurist=lawyer. ..

    Now this was a bit long and surely not a perfect explanation, but obviously this different background makes me struggle with the term appellate attorney, and admittedly it caught my interest before. From my uninformed perspective it could be both a very specialized lawyer that e.g. could be contacted in appellate cases. On the other hand such "appellate attorneys" should also exist in every appellate court, or on the side of the prosecution?

    I am aware that an American attorney can move into the job of a judge, or prosecutor and back into a law firm much more easily than over here. My problem is, while I am aware they have basically all studied law, in Germany in each of these specific cases I would be confronted with a different term that tells me exactly what I am dealing with.

    Understand my problem? But strictly I have never heard about the specialization for appeal proceedings only over here, at least I can't remember. But it may well exist and would make sense.

    The "media" do a lousy job on ordinary trials; and are not nearly equipped to handle the levels of complexity and reasoning at the appellate level.

    I had some revelation as a teenager and young adult concerning reporting especially concerning trials or prosecution. After that I have stopped to take anything for granted in this context. I think though, it's completely different with specialized criminal justice journalists (we call that Gerichtsreporter / court reporters). These people are much more reliable. But yes, they will never cover ordinary trials. I am sure you have some masters in this field too.

    To write in this field you need a solid knowledge of law, that's obvious. In the cases and/or the reporting mentioned above, I studied when younger, it wasn't only the law they got wrong, they often got many other details wrong too.

    Parent

    thanks, I didn't know this (none / 0) (#83)
    by Jeralyn on Thu Aug 30, 2012 at 01:41:58 AM EST
    By the way, when an appellate attorney refers to the "Court" with a capital "C," (s)he's talking about the reviewing court.  The trial court and lower appellate courts are referred to as "courts" with a lower case "c."  

    I always capitalize the "C" in court whenever I'm referring to any specific court doing something, just like with Judge. And the Government.

    Parent

    If you are asking whether (none / 0) (#68)
    by Jeralyn on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 11:19:52 AM EST
    the court has responded to Zimmerman's filing by ruling on it, I think the answer is not yet.

    Parent
    Yeahbut (none / 0) (#70)
    by boar d laze on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 11:28:20 AM EST
    "Ruling" is as much a process as an event.  

    It's probably advanced through the "Writ Conference, consensus and assignment of opinion stages.  Not that we'll ever know.

    Parent

    You were clear (none / 0) (#69)
    by boar d laze on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 11:22:21 AM EST
    Not that it matters much, but I understood what you were getting at and my question wasn't really directed at you.  

    From my standpoint, the only problem with "justified fear" is that "justification" is a term of art, but not the right term of art for this context.  To someone reading with a lawyer's eye, "reasonable" says pretty much everything which must be said.  However, an incomplete grasp of law lingo isn't a sin and your meaning was plenty clear.

    Jargon aside, your intuitive grasp of the requirements for DQ seems pretty damn good to me.      

    know it all person (none / 0) (#73)
    by LeaNder on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 12:30:36 PM EST
    I do apologize if I  came across as a `know-it-all' person.

    You didn't come across as a know it all person, but you didn't come across as someone completely unfamiliar or new to TalkLeft either. How can you be, if you immediately expect the blade of the guillotine falling down and cutting off your comment. ;) I was in that state before myself, as Lea Gruen, maybe, surely as Lore Hahn and finally my more familiar web identity.

    Besides your comment was perfectly legitimate concerning the rules...

    Trying again. Let's see if there is still something incriminating.

    Knowing-it-all (none / 0) (#75)
    by MJW on Tue Aug 28, 2012 at 12:49:04 PM EST
    I do apologize if I  came across as a `know-it-all' person.

    I may have mistaken your particular writing style for sounding like a know-it-all. If so, I apologize. Actually, I apologize even if you are a know-it-all, since I should have confined my comments to responding to your arguments.

    grün/gruen - groen - Green (none / 0) (#79)
    by LeaNder on Wed Aug 29, 2012 at 03:54:45 AM EST
    Intel,  welcome.

    I used Lea Grünberg, this kind of spelling, when writing little things for other artists. But it felt too long. It was an ironic salute to Clement Greenberg, more precisely his statement: art is connected by an umbilical cord  of gold with the elites, or upper class, or in pure Marxism with capital. ... Strictly, I would have preferred the critic Rosenberg, or the man Rosenberg, but Greenberg invented some impressive metaphors, especially concerning the New York School or Abstract Expressionism.

    German: gruen / Dutch: groen / English: green

    all pretty similar. Lore Hahn is my mother's maiden name. But the Hahn tribe came from the Netherlands centuries back, first to Frankfurt than to southern Germany. So there is a trace of the Netherlands nevertheless in this name business.

    GRANTED! (none / 0) (#82)
    by MJW on Wed Aug 29, 2012 at 03:26:02 PM EST
    Petition for Writ of Prohibition is granted.

    that was fast (none / 0) (#85)
    by LeaNder on Thu Aug 30, 2012 at 05:13:48 AM EST
    very short, interesting. No legal argument.

    When I read O'Mara's writ of prohibition again, or admittedly to the end for the first time, it left me with a slightly different impression.

    The minor details he writes about in the end, are much more convincing than what he writes in the first half, and they somehow add up and support his charge. Just as the change of mind in Lester concerning witness #9 is easily traceable.

    Good that I did not argue, or ask, why hasn't he moved that up to the main evidence he lists. Which was my first impulse.

    That was fast. So what judge is left?

    Parent